The Supreme Court Law
Review: Osgoode’s Annual
Constitutional Cases
Conference
Volume 88 (2019)

Article 7

Delegation, Deference and Difference: In Search of
a Principled Approach to Implementing and
Administering Aboriginal Rights
Janna Promislow
Faculty of Law, Thompson Rivers University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
Citation Information
Promislow, Janna. "Delegation, Deference and Difference: In Search of a Principled Approach to Implementing and Administering
Aboriginal Rights." The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference 88. (2019).
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/vol88/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Supreme
Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.

Delegation, Deference and
Difference: In Search of a Principled
Approach to Implementing and
Administering Aboriginal Rights
Janna Promislow

I. INTRODUCTION
In 2017, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) decided two duty to
consult cases, heard together: Clyde River (Hamlet) v. Petroleum GeoServices Inc.1 and Chippewas of the Thames First Nation v. Enbridge
Pipelines Inc.2 (“the 2017 cases”). Within the issue of whether the duty to
consult had been satisfied, key points of contention focused on who is
responsible for discharging the duty to consult Indigenous Peoples,
including assessing the adequacy of the consultation. The cases presented
the particular situation of a regulatory agency (the National Energy Board
or NEB) that had final approval authority, without the involvement of the
Crown “proper” (understood as a minister of the Crown or cabinet). In
other words, can the duty be satisfied without the Crown participating in
the process and assessing its adequacy? The Court’s answer: “While the
Crown always owes the duty to consult, regulatory processes can partially
or completely fulfill this duty.”3 A second, equally contentious issue was
about what is required of a regulatory agency in assessing the obligation to
consult when this obligation rests with it. Embedded within this issue is the

Associate Professor, Thompson Rivers University, Faculty of Law. This paper evolved
and was improved through discussions at the Osgoode Constitutional Cases Conference and the
National Roundtable on Administrative Law, held by the Canadian Institute for the Administration
of Justice. Thanks to Sonia Lawrence for her wise editorial advice and to Scott Robertson and Ben
Ralston for their insights and comments.
1
[2017] S.C.J. No. 40, 2017 SCC 40, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 1069 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Clyde
River”].
2
[2017] S.C.J. No. 41, 2017 SCC 41, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 1099 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Chippewas of the Thames”].
3
Clyde River, supra, note 1, at paras. 1 and 30; Chippewas of the Thames, id., at para. 1.
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question: what is the degree of specificity or formality with which the
existing or claimed Aboriginal or treaty rights must be treated for the duty
to assess adequacy to be discharged? The Court’s answer:
An agency will not “always [be] required to review the adequacy of
Crown consultation by applying a formulaic ‘Haida analysis’…. Nor will
explicit reasons be required in every case. The degree of consideration
that is appropriate will depend on the circumstances of each case.”4
“[W]here deep consultation is required and the issue of Crown consultation
is raised” with the agency, the agency “will be obliged to ‘explain how it
considered and addressed’ Indigenous concerns … What is necessary is an
indication that the [agency] took the asserted Aboriginal and treaty rights
into consideration and accommodated them where appropriate.”5

The Court’s answers to these key questions are responsive but also
equivocal, particularly when the statements of principle are paired with
their application in the two cases. The answers also open a host of new
questions, such as the circumstances under which the responsibility of
the agency is full or partial; how Indigenous peoples (and others
interested in the regulatory processes in issue) are supposed to be
apprised of variable distributions of responsibility for obligations owed
to them, particularly given the retrospective answer to this question in
Chippewas of the Thames; the mechanisms and processes of Crown
intervention in regulatory processes; and when agency responsibility
requires more or less explicit treatment of the right.
Although these questions deserve further attention,6 as does the
evaluation of the 2017 cases for the contributions to the duty to consult
law more generally,7 the discussion that follows will focus on how the
4

Clyde River, id., at para. 42.
Chippewas of the Thames, supra, note 2, at para. 63.
6
For some discussion, see Nigel Bankes, “Clarifying the parameters of the Crown’s duty
to consult and accommodate in the context of decision-making by energy tribunals” (December
2017) J. of Energy & Natural Resources L. 1 [hereinafter “Bankes”] and Dwight Newman,
“Changing Duty to Consult Expectations for Energy Regulators: Broader Implications from the
Supreme Court of Canada’s Decisions in Chippewas of the Thames and Clyde River” (2017) 5 Energy
Regulation Quarterly, online: <http://www.energyregulationquarterly.ca/articles/changing-duty-toconsult-expectations-for-energy-regulators-broader-implications-from-the-supreme-court-of-decisions-inchippewas-of-the-thames-and-clyde-river#sthash.BQufO0w0.dzR0Hx36.dpbs> [hereinafter “Newman
2017”]. For a discussion of how these decisions relate the obligations and authority of municipalities
with respect to the duty to consult and accommodate, see Felix Hoehn and Michael Stevens, “Local
Governments and the Crown’s Duty to Consult” (2018) 55 Alta. L. Rev. (forthcoming).
7
See John Borrows, “How Colonialism Works in Canada: Consultation, Clyde River and the
Chippewas of the Thames”, Draft Paper, 2018 (on file with author) [hereinafter “Borrows”] and
Richard Stacey, “Honour in Sovereignty: Can Crown Consultation With Indigenous Peoples Erase
5
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2017 cases relate to the treatment of constitutional rights in administrative
and discretionary contexts more generally. Active debate regarding the
current framework for the review of administrative discretion implicating
Charter8 rights and values,9 as well as tribunal jurisdiction over
constitutional questions and remedies more generally,10 suggest that these
matters are far from settled. Nevertheless, there are well-established
policy groundings for the Charter frameworks. Judicial review in the
context of administering Charter rights is aimed at governmental
accountability for meeting its constitutional obligations by ensuring that
Charter responsibilities and Charter rights enforcement is part of the
work of the administrative branch. Such an approach aims to make
Charter rights accessible to the rights-holders. As McLachlin J. (as she
was then) famously stated in Cooper v. Canada (Human Rights
Commission):11
... The Charter is not some holy grail which only judicial initiates of the
superior courts may touch. The Charter belongs to the people. … Many
more citizens have their rights determined by … tribunals than by the
Canada’s Sovereignty Deficit?” (2018) 68 U.T.L.J. 405 [hereinafter “Stacey”]. For related discussion,
see also Gordon Christie, “Developing Case Law: The Future of Consultation and Accommodation”
(2006) 39 U.B.C. L. Rev. 139 and E. Ria Tzimas, “To What End the Dialogue?” (2011) 54 S.C.L.R.
(2d) 493 and Kaitlin Ritchie, “Issues Associated with the Implementation of the Duty to Consult and
Accommodate Aboriginal Peoples: Threatening the Goals of Reconciliation and Meaningful
Consultation” (2013) 46 U.B.C. L. Rev. 347.
8
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
9
As set out in Doré v. Barreau du Québec, [2012] S.C.J. No. 12, 2012 SCC 12, [2012] 1
S.C.R. 395 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Doré”]; Loyola High School v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2015]
S.C.J. No. 12, 2015 SCC 12, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Loyola”]. For commentary,
see Audrey Macklin, “Charter Right or Charter-Lite? Administrative Discretion and the Charter”
(2014) 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) 561 [hereinafter “Macklin”]; Lorne Sossin & Mark Friedman, “Charter
Values and Administrative Justice” (2014) 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) 391 [hereinafter “Sossin & Friedman”];
Matthew Lewans, “Administrative Law, Judicial Deference, and the Charter” (2014) 23
Constitutional Forum Constitutionnel 19; Evan Fox-Decent & Alexander Pless, “The Charter and
Administrative Law Part II: Substantive Review” [hereinafter “Fox-Decent & Pless”] in Colleen M.
Flood & Lorne Sossin, eds., Administrative Law in Context, 3d ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery
Publications, 2018) 507 [hereinafter “Flood & Sossin”]; and Mary Liston, “Administering the
Charter, Proportioning Justice. Thirty-Five Years of Development in a Nutshell” (2017) 30 CJALP
211 [hereinafter “Liston”].
10
See, e.g., Nicholas Lambert, “The Charter in the Administrative Process: Statutory
Remedy or Refounding of Administrative Jurisdiction?” (2007-2008) 13 Rev. Const. Stud. 21
[hereinafter “Lambert”]; Beth Bilson, “The Voice from the Trenches: Administrative Tribunals and
the Interpretation of the Charter” (2006) 69 Sask. L. Rev. 3; Deborah K. Lovett, “Administrative
Tribunal Jurisdiction Over Constitutional Issues and the New Administrative Tribunals Act” (2005)
63 Advocate 177 [hereinafter “Lovett”]; and Fox-Decent & Pless, id.
11
[1996] S.C.J. No. 115, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 854 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Cooper”].
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courts. If the Charter is to be meaningful to ordinary people, then it
must find its expression in the decisions of … tribunals.12

In Paul v. British Columbia (Forest Appeals Commission), the Supreme
Court brought this same direction to tribunal jurisdiction regarding
section 3513 rights challenges, stating that “[t]here is no persuasive basis
for distinguishing the power to determine s. 35 questions from the power
to determine other constitutional questions. … Section 35 is not, any
more than the Charter, ‘some holy grail which only judicial initiates of
the superior courts may touch’ ....”14 But the 2017 cases do not take their
cue from Paul and instead introduce several points of difference from the
Charter context. Paul was decided before Haida Nation v. British
Columbia (Minister of Forests)15 foregrounded consultation and the
honour of the Crown in relation to section 35 interests. It is time to
revisit Paul and consider whether the assertion of there being “no
persuasive basis” to distinguish the administration of section 35 rights
from Charter rights still holds true given the evolution in tribunal
authorities and responsibilities for Charter protections and section 35
jurisprudence since this case.
Starting from the policy motivations behind the frameworks in the
Charter context, this paper will consider the 2017 cases and identify two
main points of Indigenous difference.16 The first is in respect of the
framing of tribunal jurisdictions over constitutional rights, where
“delegation” to tribunals through legislation applies in Charter contexts
while the 2017 cases introduce an element of Crown “reliance” on
tribunals into this interpretive exercise. The second area of difference is
in the review of decisions violating or implicating constitutional rights,
and particularly the application of the reasonableness standard with
respect to values (Charter context) and claimed rights (section 35
12
Id., at para. 70. Aspects of Cooper on tribunal jurisdiction over Charter challenges to its
enabling legislation were later overturned, and adopting McLachlin J.’s words in Nova Scotia
(Workers’ Compensation Board v. Martin; Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Laseur,
[2003] S.C.J. No. 54, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Martin”]. See also R. v. Conway,
[2010] S.C.J. No. 22, 2010 SCC 22, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 765 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Conway”].
13
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
14
[2003] S.C.J. No. 34, 2003 SCC 55, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 585, at para. 36 (S.C.C.) (citations
omitted) [hereinafter “Paul”].
15
[2004] S.C.J. No. 70, 2004 SCC 73, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Haida
Nation”].
16
With apologies to Patrick Macklem for potentially bending his 2001 book title out of
shape from his original use of this term to refer to socio-economic and historical differences, rather
than differences of treatment in the law as I am using it here: Patrick Macklem, Indigenous
Difference and the Constitution of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001).
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context) that have not yet crystallized as rights or as rights that have been
violated. The paper will demonstrate that to some extent, Indigenous
difference in the administration of constitutional rights and obligations
might reflect narratives of Crown and Indigenous treaty relationships,
ongoing questions about Crown sovereignty, and the premise that
negotiated solutions to section 35 rights disputes and claims are
preferred.17 Such narratives already provide a purposive grounding for
the duty to consult and accommodate. This paper will explore whether
they also provide a purposive (and principled) grounding for understanding
the posture and approaches the Court should adopt in judicial review of
administrative decisions that implicate section 35 rights. In spite of such
differences, my main argument will be that an approach of “difference” is
unsupported by any purposive or historical differences between section 35
and Charter rights, and instead undermines processes of reconciliation
that the duty to consult is intended to support. Even taking into account
rigorous debate and cautions relating to the evolving framework for
review of decisions breaching Charter rights under a “reasonableness as
proportionality” standard,18 I nevertheless suggest that applying the same
judicial review principles relating to the intersection of constitutional and
administrative law would better protect the rights-quality of section 35
rights than the directions coming out of the 2017 cases. Ultimately, the
motivating policies for the Charter approaches are equally pressing in the
section 35 context: the adjudication of section 35 rights must be made
accessible to Indigenous rights-holders.
The paper will start with a brief overview of the cases and the factual
differences emphasized by the Supreme Court to reach different results
for the Indigenous parties. I will then turn to consider how the Court’s
treatment of the role of administrative tribunals in the duty to consult and
accommodate is different from the treatment of tribunal jurisdiction and
responsibility for Charter rights and other constitutional issues, first with
respect to the jurisdiction of tribunals over constitutional questions; and
second, with respect to proportionality in reasonableness review of
administrative decisions impacting constitutional rights protections. With
respect to each of these aspects of tribunal responsibility and authority
17
Such themes are long-standing in the s. 35 jurisprudence — R. v. Sparrow, [1990] S.C.J.
No. 49, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Sparrow”] and Delgamuukw v. British
Columbia, [1997] S.C.J. No. 108, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (S.C.C) [hereinafter “Delgamuukw”]. This
orientation also relates to the history of s. 35; see note 70, below.
18
As discussed in the materials noted, supra, note 8 and discussed in detail in Part III.2,
below.
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over constitutional matters, I will try to make sense of these differences,
searching for purposes and reasons that can explain the differences and
identifying absences of principle. Finally, I will conclude by considering
principled directions for the development of this law.

II. THE CASES
The 2017 consultation cases involved similar regulatory structures
vis-à-vis the role of the Crown, but were otherwise quite dissimilar. In
Clyde River, the Inuit of the Nunavut hamlet contended with
international oil and gas companies (the “proponents”) who were seeking
a geophysical operations authorization (“GOA”) from the National
Energy Board to conduct seismic testing in Baffin Bay and Davis Strait
under section 5 of the Canada Oil and Gas Operations Act.19 The
seismic testing in issue is known to have impacts on marine mammals,
including the seals and narwhal that are part of the country food diet the
Inuit of the area continue to rely on. The marine mammals are also the
subject of treaty rights under the Nunavut Land Claim Agreement,20
including priority Inuit harvesting rights and commitments to Inuit
participation in wildlife management decisions and resource management
that sustains and restores depleted wildlife populations.21 The GOA
decision was subject to a proponent-led environmental assessment
process that did not require a panel hearing. The proponent did a poor job
of responding to Inuit questions about the testing, posting practically
inaccessible and long documents only after community consultation
meetings.22 While organizations representing Inuit contacted the Minister
of Aboriginal and Northern Affairs specifically requesting a strategic
environmental assessment (SEA) prior to issuance of the GOA, the
Minister declined to delay the GOA to allow this broader environmental
assessment process to take place first.23 The NEB thus issued the GOA to
the proponents without significant participation from a Minister of the
Crown. On judicial review, Karakatsanis and Brown JJ., writing for the
full Court, found that the consultation process was significantly flawed
and quashed the GOA.
19
20
21
22
23

R.S.C. 1985 c. O-7 [hereinafter “COGOA”].
Inuit of the Nunavut Settlement Area and Canada, May 25, 1993 [hereinafter “NCLA”].
Id., articles 5, 15, 16, esp. 5.1.2-5.1.6, 16.1.3
Clyde River, supra, note 1, at para. 49.
Id., at para. 13.
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In Chippewas of the Thames, treaty harvesting rights were also in issue,
but this time arising from a series of historic treaties dating from the early
19th century. Beyond the scope of these treaties, the Chippewas of the
Thames First Nation also claim Aboriginal title to the riverbed of the
Thames River and an Aboriginal right to use the water of the Thames
River.24 Enbridge Pipelines Inc. proposed a pipeline modification project to
reverse the flow of part of its 40-year-old Line 9 pipeline to move eastward
from Sarnia to Montreal, and also increase its capacity and allow it to carry
diluted bitumen or heavy crude. The project was subject to approval under
section 58 of the National Energy Board Act,25 an authority that allows the
NEB to issue a final approval of smaller pipeline projects without the
involvement of the federal cabinet. The Chippewas of the Thames and other
First Nations were notified about the project by Enbridge and then
participated in the environmental assessment hearing process conducted by
the NEB. The Chippewas of the Thames First Nation also sent letters to the
Prime Minister and other Cabinet Ministers prior to the NEB hearings
raising concerns, including that no Crown-led consultation had occurred
with respect to the proposed project. They called on the Ministers to initiate
consultations. A response was received only after the NEB hearing process
was concluded, during which the Chippewas of the Thames and other First
Nations presented their concerns about the impacts of the proposed project
on their lands, livelihoods and heritage. The ministerial response, received
only after the hearing concluded, was to the effect that the Crown would rely
on the NEB’s process to fulfil its duty to consult on the project. The NEB
thus approved the Line 9 project without direct participation of the Crown.
In this case, the Supreme Court (again with Karakatsanis and Brown JJ.
writing) found that the duty to consult and accommodate had been satisfied
and upheld the approval.
The Court’s treatment of the administrative law issues in these cases
was given short shrift in favour of a focus on the merits: was the duty to
consult met in each of the cases? The absence of the administrative law
notably aligns with recent discussions in the jurisprudence urging judicial
review to focus on the merits of the cases rather than the abstract
intricacies of judicial review.26 This absence, however, is also a notable
24
Factum of the Chippewas of the Thames First Nation, at para. 13. Additional rights claims
included Aboriginal rights to access and preserve sacred sites and a treaty right to exclusive use and
enjoyment of Reserve lands; summarized by the SCC, Chippewas of the Thames, supra, note 2, at para. 7.
25
R.S.C. 1985, c. N-7 [hereinafter “NEB Act”].
26
For example, Abella J. in Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., [2016] S.C.J. No. 29,
2016 SCC 29, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 770, at para. 25 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Wilson”].
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departure from previous cases addressing the fit of the duty to consult
with regulatory processes. Unlike in Haida Nation; Carrier Sekani
Tribal Council27 and Beckman v. Little Salmon/Carmacks First
Nation,28 there were no overtures to the utility and flexibility of
administrative law to absorb and address the issues and context of the
duty to consult. Further, there was no mention of deference or the
standard of review in either judgment, an absence that demonstrates
what Paul Daly has described as the compelling inconsistency of the
standard of review doctrine.29 Perhaps the absence demonstrates that it
was easier for the Supreme Court to agree on the merits of these cases
than the standards of review and what they mean. Regardless of the
motivations, the Court’s discussion of what constitutes meaningful
consultation, particularly in Clyde River, is significantly more
directive than its treatment of the administrative law issues.
Nevertheless, the lack of explicit treatment does not mean these cases
lack administrative law significance.

III. INDIGENOUS DIFFERENCE AND THE 2017 CASES
1. Reliance and the Premises of Deference
(a) Identifying Indigenous Difference
On the administrative law issues, the 2017 cases pick up issues addressed
in the 2010 decision, Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, which set out that “[t]he
legislature may choose to delegate to a tribunal the Crown’s duty to
consult”30 and in addition, or alternatively, “the legislature may choose to
confine a tribunal’s power to determinations of whether adequate
consultation has taken place, as a condition of its statutory decision-making
process.”31 The latter authority depends on expressed or implied authority in
the legislation over questions of law, following the course established in
Martin and Paul regarding tribunal authority to decide questions of
27
Carrier Sekani Tribal Council v. Rio Tinto Alcan, [2010] S.C.J. No. 43, 2010 SCC 43,
[2010] 2 S.C.R. 650 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Carrier Sekani Tribal Council”].
28
[2010] S.C.J. No. 53, 2010 SCC 53, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Little
Salmon/Carmacks First Nation”].
29
Paul Daly, “Why is Standard of Review So Addictive?” Blog: Administrative Law Matters
(February 12, 2018), online: <http://www.administrativelawmatters.com/blog/2018/02/12/why-isstandard-of-review-so-addictive/>.
30
Supra, note 27, at para. 56.
31
Id., at para. 57.
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constitutional law. The former authority depends on the remedial powers
discernible from the legislation and specifically that a tribunal with authority
to engage in consultation must “possess remedial powers necessary to do
what it is asked to do in connection with the consultation”,32 following the
course established in Conway regarding tribunal jurisdiction to grant Charter
section 24 remedies.33
The 2017 cases confirmed the approach from Carrier Sekani Tribal
Council. However, taking its cue from the arguments of several of the
parties,34 the Supreme Court also added new glosses to these established
approaches. Tribunal authority was repackaged as a matter of Crown
reliance on tribunal processes rather than a matter of legislative
delegation of authority to administrative tribunals:
The Crown may rely on a regulatory agency in this way so long as the
agency possesses the statutory powers to do what the duty to consult
requires in the particular circumstances. ... However, if the agency’s
statutory powers are insufficient in the circumstances or if the agency
does not provide adequate consultation and accommodation, the Crown
must provide further avenues for meaningful consultation and
accommodation in order to fulfill the duty prior to project approval.35

Is this new language significant? Is it different to switch the focus of
the analysis from the agency, to whom legislatures might intend to
delegate an obligation (or be assumed to intend absent an explicit
withdrawal of authority), to the Crown, whose duty lies outside and
beyond legislation, and who might rely on administrative agencies to assist
with the carrying out of the Crown’s obligations?36 In a word, yes.37
Under the reliance theory, new questions arise. For example, how
might Indigenous parties (or proponents for that matter) be expected to
32

Id., at para. 60.
For discussion, see Janna Promislow, “Irreconcilable? The Duty to Consult and Administrative
Decision Makers” (2013) 22 Constitutional Forum Constitutionnel 63 [hereinafter “Promislow 2013”].
34
See, e.g., the facta of the Respondent Attorney General for Canada, and of the Appellants
Chippewas of the Thames First Nation and The Hamlet of Clyde River.
35
Chippewas of the Thames, supra, note 2, at para. 32 (emphasis added and citations omitted).
36
The language of reliance was not brand new in these decisions. It has been part of the
federal policy guidelines on the duty to consult since at least 2011 (Department of Aboriginal Affairs
and Northern Development Canada, Aboriginal Consultation and Accommodation – Updated
Guidelines for Federal Officials to Fulfill the Duty to Consult (March 2011), online:
<http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100014664/1100100014675>). It was also used by the
Federal Court of Appeal in Hamlet of Clyde River v. TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. ASA (TGS),
[2015] F.C.J. No. 991, 2015 FCA 179 (F.C.A.).
37
For a more limited view of what the cases decided, although without analysis of the
language of reliance, see Newman 2017, supra, note 6.
33
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know about Crown’s intention to rely on the regulatory process in a
given case? The Court’s answer was that “where the Crown relies on the
processes of a regulatory body to fulfill its duty in whole or in part, it
should be made clear to affected Indigenous groups that the Crown is so
relying.”38 Any potential stringency of such a requirement was, however,
immediately undermined by the application of these principles in
Chippewas of the Thames, in which efforts to engage the Crown
separately from the NEB hearing process were not answered until after
the NEB had approved the Line 9 project. Instead, the Court considered
the NEB’s early notice of the hearing process along with knowledge
that the NEB was the final decision-maker in the matter and that the
Crown was not a participant in the process, to have “made it sufficiently
clear to the Chippewas of the Thames that the NEB process was intended
to constitute Crown consultation and accommodation.”39 Intended by
whom, one wonders — Parliament or the Crown? Under Carrier Sekani
Tribal Council (and Martin, Paul and Conway), the role of the tribunal
vis-à-vis the duty to consult was a question of legislative intent. In
Chippewas of the Thames, the question of reliance became one of
constructive Indigenous party knowledge and maybe Crown and/or
legislative intent. This is different. It is premised on different facts and a
different kind of inquiry, such that the well-trodden principles of
discerning and respecting legislative intent in these circumstances may
prove to be of limited assistance in spite of the centrality of these
principles in Carrier Sekani Tribal Council and the rest of public law.
(b) Explaining and Evaluating this Difference
To address the potential friction between the premises of deference
and the concept of Crown reliance on regulatory process, we must first
understand the non-delegable quality of the honour of the Crown. The
non-delegable quality of the honour of the Crown was first addressed in
the seminal Haida Nation decision. Among the issues decided in that
case was whether Weyerhaeuser Company Ltd., a non-governmental
party proponent and beneficiary of the government conduct in question,
bore legal responsibility for the duty to consult. The Supreme Court held
unambiguously it did not:
38

Clyde River, supra, note 1, at para. 23. See also Chippewas of the Thames, supra, note 2,

at para. 44.
39

Chippewas of the Thames, id., at para. 46 (emphasis added).
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[T]he duty to consult and accommodate … flows from the Crown’s
assumption of sovereignty over lands and resources formerly held by the
Aboriginal group. This theory provides no support for an obligation on
third parties to consult or accommodate. The Crown alone remains
legally responsible for the consequences of its actions and interactions
with third parties, that affect Aboriginal interests. The Crown may
delegate procedural aspects of consultation to industry proponents
seeking a particular development; this is not infrequently done in
environmental assessments. … However, the ultimate legal responsibility
for consultation and accommodation rests with the Crown. The honour of
the Crown cannot be delegated.40

This statement was in relation to the issue of third party liability,41
distinct in both tone and content from the commentary the Supreme
Court offered at the time, in both Haida Nation and the companion case
Taku River Tlingit First Nation,42 on how the duty would be integrated
with the existing regulatory state. In that commentary, it was equally
clear that the Supreme Court envisioned the duty being carried out within
existing regulatory structures, and even offered a hopeful note that
governments might “set up regulatory schemes to address the procedural
requirements appropriate to different problems at different stages,
thereby strengthening the reconciliation process and reducing recourse to
the courts.”43 In these statements, the Court in Haida Nation did not
suggest that the duty cannot be delegated in the administrative law sense
of the word.44 Indeed, Carrier Sekani Tribal Council confirmed that even
accommodation  the substantive element of the duty  may be
delivered by administrative bodies, although only to the extent that is
consistent with the remedies available within the pertinent statutes.45
Thus, the non-delegable quality of the constitutional principle of the
40

Haida Nation, supra, note 15, at para. 53.
The obligations of third parties in private law in relation to interference with Aboriginal
title specifically are currently being litigated in relation to the tort of nuisance; see the dismissal of
the application for summary judgment in Saik’uz First Nation and Stellat’en First Nation v. Rio
Tinto Alcan Inc., [2015] B.C.J. No. 694, 2015 BCCA 154 (B.C.C.A.).
42
Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), [2004]
S.C.J. No. 69, 2004 SCC 74, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 550 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Taku River Tlingit First Nation”].
43
Haida Nation, supra, note 15, at para. 51.
44
The one point of connection is the reference to the “procedural” aspects as the delegable
part of the duty, whether to third parties or the regulatory bodies that are part and parcel of
“government” if not the Crown. This point that deserves further attention, particularly in light of the
Supreme Court’s insistence in Tsilhqot’in Nation of the duty as procedural in nature, leaving the
substantive elements of accommodation to other elements within the justification analysis. For
discussion of the procedural nature of the duty to consult, see Stacey, supra, note 7.
45
Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, supra, note 27.
41
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honour of the Crown46 is akin to the applicability principles under section
32 of the Charter that have been interpreted to mean that the Charter does
not govern disputes between private parties directly.47 Further, it is
distinct from the administrative law principles, which demand the
opposite: obligations that flow from the honour of the Crown must bind
administrative agencies so that government cannot avoid constitutional
obligations simply through legislative delegations.48
In the 2017 version of these principles, the Supreme Court described
the Crown as always holding “ultimate responsibility for ensuring
consultation is adequate.”49 This statement does not mean that the duty
cannot be delegated. It also does not mean that the regulatory process
cannot fully satisfy the constitutional obligations in a given case.50
Nevertheless, if it is to mean anything, it means that the duty cannot be
fully or completely delegated without some Crown oversight. This
language suggests that the Crown must be aware of consultation
processes and must be confident in them and/or evaluate the adequacy of
consultation administered through regulatory processes. As Karakatsanis
and Brown JJ. explained, this awareness does not have to be at the
granulated level of each individual consultation process with each
Indigenous community:
[A] minister of the Crown [is not required to] give explicit consideration
in every case to whether the duty to consult has been satisfied, … [nor
are they required to] directly participate in the process of consultation.
Where the regulatory process being relied upon does not achieve
adequate consultation or accommodation, the Crown must take further
measures to meet its duty. This might entail filling any gaps on a
case-by-case basis or more systemically through legislative or regulatory
amendments .... Or, it might require making submissions to the
regulatory body, requesting reconsideration of a decision, or seeking a
postponement in order to carry out further consultation in a separate
process before the decision is rendered. And, if an affected Indigenous
group is (like the Inuit of Nunavut) a party to a modern treaty and
46

Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, supra, note 28, at para. 42.
Dolphin Delivery v. Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 580, [1986]
S.C.J. No. 75, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 (S.C.C.); Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local
558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd., [2002] S.C.J. No. 7, 2002 SCC 8, [2002] 1 S.C.R.
156 (S.C.C.).
48
Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), [2000] S.C.J. No. 43, 2000
SCC 44, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 307 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Blencoe”]; Godbout v. Longueuil (City), [1997]
S.C.J. No. 95, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 844 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Godbout”].
49
Clyde River, supra, note 1, at para. 22; Chippewas of the Thames, supra, note 2, at para. 37.
50
For discussion, see Newman 2017, supra, note 6.
47
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perceives the process to be deficient, it should, as it did here, request such
direct Crown engagement in a timely manner (since parties to treaties are
obliged to act diligently to advance their respective interests).51

The ultimate responsibility of the Crown is thus connected to a
conversation with Indigenous parties, who are expected to make the
Crown aware of the procedural deficiencies of at least specific regulatory
processes.
Perhaps out of a concern to not overstep its proper competence and
inappropriately and inadvertently overburden government, the Court was
vague on what is required of government in its “ultimate responsibility”
role. The onus to bring the inadequacies of regulatory consultations to
the Crown’s attention in a particular case clearly lies with Indigenous
Peoples, with no corresponding obligation on the Crown to respond. This
feather-light onus on the Crown to anticipate and be deliberate in its
engagements with consultation through the regulatory processes creates
additional hurdles for Indigenous parties seeking recognition and
accommodation of their constitutional rights. Not requiring specific
attention by the Crown  or, as we will see in the next section, tribunals
either  to the implementation and assessment of Aboriginal rights also
bolsters arguments that the duty facilitates assimilation rather than
reconciliation.52 This approach also does not, as Richard Stacey argues it
should, promote the duty to consult as a vehicle for state accountability
to Indigenous Peoples.53 But for my purposes in this paper, the focus is
on the implications of a reliance approach to section 35 constitutional
responsibilities, as opposed to the tried-and-true delegation approach for
the Charter.
The most significant innovation in the reliance framework flows from
a change in the role of legislative intent. In the Charter context,
delegation to adjudicate rights and the extent of section 24(1) remedial
authority depends on legislative intent, while responsibilities to uphold
Charter rights and values flow from the application of the Charter to
tribunals under section 32 and section 52.54 Government can choose to
organize the adjudication of rights by removing Charter jurisdictions
from particular tribunals, but it is questionable whether legislatures can
remove responsibilities to attend to Charter values in decision-making
51
52
53
54

Clyde River, supra, note 1, at para. 22 (citations omitted).
See authors cited in supra, note 6.
Stacey, supra, note 7.
Conway, supra, note 12.
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from tribunals.55 In relation to the Charter and in administrative law more
generally, legislative intent is a cornerstone for understanding the scope
of authorities and obligations entrusted to administrative agencies and
actors of all sorts and the role of the courts on judicial review.56
Switching to the section 35 context, the Crown’s ability to rely on
regulatory processes is determined through a mix of Crown and
legislative intent. Moreover, the Crown’s ultimate authority for the
adequacy of consultation  pinned to a non-delegable constitutional
principle, the parameters of which I suggest above have been
inappropriately extended in the context of administrative law  suggests
there can be no legislative intent to fully delegate the duty, or at least not
the obligation to assess adequacy and make up for any missing elements.
Instead, the statements in Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames
create a constitutional limitation on legislative intent, such that some
constitutional responsibilities cannot be delegated, even where questions
of law are clearly within tribunal authority (such as in the case of the
NEB in the 2017 cases).
To be clear, this is more of a theoretical or structural problem than a
functional one. The constitutional limitation does not undermine the
ability of regulatory agencies to fully carry out the duty. Instead, it
changes point of inquiry from one of what legislatures intended ahead of
a particular process to a mostly retrospective focus on what the executive
did and intended in relation to a particular process. The Crown, rather
than the legislature, must determine the fullness of the agency’s process
in relation to the satisfaction of constitutional obligations. This point of
Indigenous difference inverts of the usual hierarchies of law and policy,
putting the Crown in the driver’s seat and limiting the control of the
legislature.57 By potentially re-orienting judicial review to a distinct
Crown decision to rely or not rely on regulatory decisions and
55
See, e.g., Ismail v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), [2013] B.C.J. No. 1308,
2013 BCSC 1079 (B.C.S.C.): “A direction in the legislation that a tribunal has no jurisdiction to
decide constitutional questions relating to the Charter should not be viewed as a direction that the
tribunal should ignore Charter values” (at para. 309). See also Duncan v. British Columbia (Human
Rights Tribunal), [2017] B.C.J. No. 2651, 2017 BCSC 2375, at paras. 60-101 (B.C.S.C.).
56
A key point of debate in this area has been whether it is constitutional for legislatures to
remove consideration of the Charter from the fulfilment of legal responsibilities. For commentary
see Lambert, supra, note 10, and Fox-Decent & Pless, supra, note 9.
57
This is itself problematic. For related analysis see Janna Promislow & Naiomi Metallic,
“Realizing Aboriginal Administrative Law” [hereinafter “Promislow & Metallic”] in Flood &
Sossin, supra, note 9, at 87; and Kate Glover Berger, “Diagnosing Administrative Law: A Comment
on Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames First Nation” (2019) 88 S.C.L.R. (2d) 107.
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processes,58 this point also aggravates a dynamic noted by commentators
in relation to judicial review of ministerial decisions affecting Charter
rights and values under which courts defer to government actors who
may be “inclined to trade off individual rights in the name of political
gain.”59 This inclination is at least as strong in relation to Aboriginal
rights, the protection of which often remains in juxtaposition or outside
the conception of the public interest.60 It further throws a wrench in the
workings of the usual administrative law theory of deference on top of an
already confused and confusing application of standard of review logic to
review of the duty to consult.61 The key issue emerging from this new twist
is whether a tribunal can ever be presumed to be an expert in relation to its
responsibilities over the duty to consult when legislatures are constitutionally
barred from fully delegating these responsibilities to them.
A more detailed review of the potential questions at stake within a
judicial review of a decision on the duty to consult and accommodate will
wait until the next section, below. The question at stake in the Crown’s
particular, non-delegable role is adequacy, a question to which deference
applies. As the Federal Court of Appeal explained in Gitxaala Nation:
“When considering whether that duty has been fulfilled — i.e., the
58

The potential for this structure to create additional opportunities and decisions for judicial
review was not treated by the Court in the 2017 cases. However, it was already present in the case
law. See, e.g., Gitxaala Nation v. Canada, [2016] F.C.J. No. 705, 2016 FCA 187 (F.C.A.)
[hereinafter “Gitxaala Nation”]; Prophet River First Nation v. Canada (Attorney General), [2017]
F.C.J. No. 64, 2017 FCA 15 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter “Prophet River FCA”], leave to appeal to the
Supreme Court denied [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 127 (S.C.C.); Prophet River v. British Columbia
(Minister of the Environment), [2017] B.C.J. No. 182, 2017 BCCA 58 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter
“Prophet River BCCA”], leave to appeal to the Supreme Court denied [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 127
(S.C.C.). For a critique of this development, see Newman 2017, supra, note 6.
59
Macklin, supra, note 9, at 574. For a similar point, in relation to the potential conflict
inherent in relation to tribunals tasked with both the obligation to carry out the duty to consult and
the obligation to assess the adequacy of consultation, as quasi-judicial and independent tribunals, see
Bankes, supra, note 6.
60
Clyde River addressed this issue, but indicating that the public interest is not supported by
decisions that breach constitutionally protected rights (supra, note 1, at para. 40). But short of a
determination of a breach of rights, it is unclear how the unresolved rights claims often at stake in
the duty to consult impact the public interest. See, for example, the minority decision in Ktunaxa
Nation v. British Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations), [2017] S.C.J. No. 54,
2017 SCC 54 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ktunaxa Nation”] (decided just after the 2017 consultation
cases) and commentary in Naiomi Metallic, “Deference and Legal Frameworks Not Designed By,
For or With Us” [hereinafter “Metallic”], The Dunsmuir Decade, a blog symposium hosted by Paul
Daly (Administrative Law Matters) and Leonid Sirota (Double Aspect), (February 27, 2018), online:
<http://www.administrativelawmatters.com/blog/2018/02/27/deference-and-legal-frameworks-notdesigned-by-for-or-with-us-naiomi-metallic/> [hereinafter “The Dunsmuir Decade”].
61
For a thorough discussion of the standard of review, see Nunatukavut Community Council
Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] F.C.J. No. 969, 2015 FC 981, at paras. 79-94 (F.C.).
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adequacy of consultation — we are not to insist on a standard of
perfection; rather, only reasonable satisfaction is required.”62 But tribunals
may still be responsible for assessing adequacy. Post-Clyde River and
Chippewas of the Thames, should deference be applied to tribunal
assessments of adequacy or just the Crown’s? To be clear, this issue is not
addressed in the decisions. The Court skipped the discussion of deference
altogether. However, the theory of ultimate Crown responsibility suggests
deference to tribunals on these questions is not appropriate. It is possible to
argue that the reliance theory does not remove delegation of the question
of adequacy from tribunals, but rather adds a further layer of assessment
on top of the delegation, and that this leaves in place the premises of
legislative intent to delegate such matters to expert tribunals. But this
argument fails to recognize the structural limit on tribunal authority put in
place in Chippewas of the Thames and Clyde River. Related concerns are
identified in United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 401 v. Alberta
(Attorney General),63 in which the Alberta Court of Appeal noted that
where constitutional jurisdictions have been explicitly removed by statute,
the standard of review will be affected even when it is a discretionary
decision at stake:
The Administrative Procedures and Jurisdiction Act should not be
viewed as a direction to Alberta tribunals that they should ignore Charter
values. As Doré states at para. 35 “administrative decisions are always
required to consider fundamental values”. But because the statute limits
their power to directly resolve Charter issues by limiting their jurisdiction,
the statute will necessarily influence the standard of review analysis
relating to the tribunal’s decisions. As Doré points out at para. 30, the
rule in Dunsmuir is based in part on legislative intent, and the intent of
the Administrative Procedures and Jurisdiction Act is clearly that the
excluded tribunals have a limited role to play in this area. … In all the
circumstances, applying the four part test in Dunsmuir, the standard of
review of the compliance of the decision of the Adjudicator with the
Charter should be reviewed for correctness.64

62

Gitxaala Nation, supra, note 58, at para. 8.
[2012] A.J. No. 427, 2012 ABCA 130, 349 D.L.R. (4th) 654 (Alta. C.A.) [hereinafter
“UFCW (ABCA)”], affd Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. United Food and
Commercial Workers, Local 401, [2013] S.C.J. No. 62, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 733, 2013 SCC 62 (S.C.C.)
(standard of review was not discussed at the S.C.C.). Note, however, that there are differences
among members of the Supreme Court on characterizing legislative intent through specific indicators
that lead away from deference. See, e.g., Edmonton (City) v. Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping
Centres Limited, [2016] S.C.J. No. 47, 2016 SCC 47, [2016] 2 S.C.R. 293 (S.C.C.).
64
UFCW (ABCA), id., at paras. 42, 44.
63
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The logic here is augmented in Clyde River and Chippewas of the
Thames by the constitutional nature of the limitation on legislative intent.
A legislature cannot intend a tribunal to be the expert on a matter that
they are constitutionally restricted from fully or finally delegating to the
tribunal.65 Thus in a move aimed at a different problem, the Supreme
Court in Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames has arguably
rebalanced the standard of review question in favour of correctness
across all aspects of the duty to consult, at least when it is the decisions
of a tribunal rather than a minister of the Crown being reviewed.66
At a time when a potentially wholesale revisiting of the standard of
review analysis is pending,67 and the role of correctness review is already
in question,68 the relevance of these arguments may only be to reveal
structural relationship between the executive, the legislature and the
courts.69 But as an argument about how Aboriginal rights are
implemented and administered, and how this differs from the Charter
context, the structural point is nevertheless illuminating. It is difficult to
imagine other contexts in the Canadian constitutional state in which a
constitutional obligation be so anchored in the executive so as to place a
65
The 2017 cases are especially interesting in light of the evolving standard of review
doctrines, in which the role of a contextual versus presumptive approach to legislative intent in
relation to tribunal expertise continues to be debated; see the reasons of the majority and the
concurring reasons of Brown J. in Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v. Canada
(Attorney General), [2018] S.C.J. No. 31, 2018 SCC 31 (S.C.C.).
66
See, e.g., Ktunaxa Nation, supra, note 60, in which the scope of consultation required
was at the deep end of the scale, and the Supreme Court applied reasonableness to how the Minister
conducted the consultation. For commentary, see Janna Promislow, “Deference with a Difference:
Dunsmuir and Aboriginal Rights” [hereinafter “Promislow 2018”], The Dunmsuir Decade, supra,
note 60. Since expertise rests with the Crown under the reliance theory, Chippewas of the Thames
and Clyde River do not give rise to arguments that disturb the approach to deference in relation to
decisions of ministers and their delegates. This raises the odd possibility that there should be
deference to ministers on the same decisions where deference is not owed to tribunals.
Administrative law since Dunsmuir has moved away from distinguishing between tribunals and
other types of administrative decision-makers, such as ministers and their delegates. Applying
deference to ministerial decision-makers but not tribunals is not a promising path to follow.
67
As the Supreme Court has signalled in its leave decision on Bell Canada v. Canada
(Attorney General), [2018] S.C.C.A. No. 9 (S.C.C.), and to be heard alongside National Football
League v. Canada (Attorney General), [2018] S.C.C.A. No. 28 (S.C.C.) and Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 352 (S.C.C.).
68
See comments of Abella J. in Wilson, supra, note 26, and commentary in The Dunsmuir
Decade, supra, note 60.
69
Indeed, structural characteristics of the relationships between the institutions of
government and the balancing of legislative supremacy and the rule of law are what proponents of
maintaining the correctness standard point to as its primary purpose. See, for example, the
concurring reasons of Rowe and Côté JJ. in Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Canada
(Attorney General), [2018] S.C.J. No. 31, 2018 SCC 31, at para. 77 (S.C.C.).
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limit on legislative action to reorganize how that constitutional obligation
is carried out. While the ethereal limit imposed by the reliance theory
does not allow the Crown’s conduct to displace legislation, the everpresent and overarching responsibility of the Crown certainly nudges
towards an inversion of the usual hierarchy of legislation displacing
Crown prerogatives.70 This suggested inversion in turn reminds us that,
unlike their Charter cousins, the Aboriginal rights protected by the
Constitution Act, 1982 are not established by the text of section 35.
Instead, the content and existence of section 35 rights was expected to be
defined through further constitutional negotiations.71 In the wake of the
failure of those post-1982 processes, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
has treated Aboriginal rights as rights that have to be proven, on a caseby-case basis, while treaty rights give rise to litigation of both scope and
application of the right, along with questions of existence.72 Only the
former type of treaty right case is akin to what the Charter rights
litigation attempts to determine.73
In the 2017 cases, Indigenous parties argued for Crown responsibility
in consultation processes. These arguments reflect their experiences of
articulating concerns over threats to their treaty rights to whomever has
been identified as the consultation partner, only to have their concerns
bounced between proponent-agency-Crown without ever being directly
addressed.74 Their arguments also reflect conceptions of treaties supporting
nation-to-nation relationships. Indigenous nations have long viewed their
treaty relationships as being with the Crown, referring to the monarch, and
70
Craig Forcese, “The Executive, The Royal Prerogative, and the Constitution” in Peter
Oliver, Patrick Macklem & Nathalie Des Rosiers, eds., The Oxford Handbook of The Canadian
Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017) 150, at 155-58.
71
Douglas E. Sanders, “The Indian Lobby” in Keith Banting & Richard Simeon, eds., And
No One Cheered: Federalism Democracy and the Constitution Act (Toronto: Methuen, 1983) 301, at
320; Michael Woodward & Bruce George, “The Canadian Indian Lobby of Westminster 1979-1982”
(Fall 1983) 18 J. of Cdn. Studies 119; Peter H. Russell, Constitutional Odyssey: Can Canadians
Become a Sovereign People?, 2d ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), at 122, and
Chapters 10, 11; Madeline Rose Knickerbocker & Sarah Nickel, “Negotiating Sovereignty:
Indigenous Perspectives on the Patriation of a Settler Colonial Constitution, 1975-83” (2016) 190
BC Studies 67 and Jeremy Webber, “After Patriation: Aboriginal Rights, Meech Lake, and
Charlottetown, 1982-1992” in Reimagining Canada: Language, Culture, Community and the
Canadian Constitution (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994) 122.
72
Promislow 2013, supra, note 33, at 65. See also Prophet River FCA, supra, note 58, at
para. 36.
73
Sparrow, supra, note 17.
74
As explained, for example, by Scott Robertson regarding the experience of the
Chippewas of the Thames First Nation: “Pushing the Bounds of Administrative Law to Get Closer to
Justice”, National Roundtable on Administrative Law, Ottawa, Ontario (June 2, 2018).
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not with the administrative delegates and branches far removed (in theory,
independent from) the head of state.75 A nation-to-nation relationship
requires that treaty relationships be renewed and for ongoing negotiations
of disputed matters.76 Decisions on important projects affecting Indigenous
lands, waters, and resource use and the regulatory processes by which such
projects are decided are undoubtedly matters that require discussion. If
those discussions are understood as part of an ongoing treaty relationship,
they are not just about a free-standing duty to consult, but about a
continuation of a treaty relationship with more than a project-based
foundation in consent.77 Moreover, the difference between “claimed”
versus “proven or recognized” status at Canadian law does not change the
nature of the treaty relationship or the connection between consultations
and those treaty relationships. From such a perspective, allowing the
Crown to rely on independent tribunals for all aspects of its treaty-based
consultation obligations may jump too far ahead of the conversations that
enduring treaty relationships require, particularly where the tribunal was
not itself established in relation to treaty discussions and commitments.78
The arguments of the Indigenous parties find some resonance with a
structural perspective of what the reliance theory achieves, resonance
that provides a glimmer of a reasoned basis for the Indigenous difference
75
For example, before patriation in 1982, Treaty First Nations brought an action in the
United Kingdom arguing that the treaty obligations were still owed by the Queen in right of Her
Government in the United Kingdom, in an attempt to block patriation: The Queen v. The Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte: The Indian Association of Alberta, Union of New
Brunswick Indians, Union of Nova Scotian Indians, [1981] 4 C.N.L.R. 86 (U.K. C.A.). See also,
“Constitution Express”, Indigenous Foundations, online: <https://indigenousfoundations.arts.
ubc.ca/constitution_express/>; Clive Linklater et al., “The Constitution Story” (1982), Saskatchewan
Indian, Constitution Special Edition 7, online: <http://www.sicc.sk.ca/archive/saskindian/a82apr04.htm>.
76
For discussion, see Mark D. Walters, “Brightening the Covenant Chain: Aboriginal
Treaty Meanings in Law and History After Marshall” (2001) 24 Dal. L.J. 75; John Borrows,
“Ground-Rules: Indigenous Treaties in Canada and New Zealand” (2006) 22 N.Z.U. L. Rev. 188;
James [Sa’ke’j] Youngblood Henderson, “Dialogical Governance: A Mechanism of Constitutional
Governance” (2009) 72 Sask. L. Rev. 29; James Tully, “Consent, Hegemony, and Dissent in Treaty
Negotiations” in Jeremy Webber & Colin M. Macleod, eds., Between Consenting Peoples. Political
Community and the Meaning of Consent (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2010)
233 and Janna Promislow, “Treaties in History and Law” (2014) 47 U.B.C. L. Rev. 1085; and essays
in John Borrows & Michael Coyle, eds., The Right Relationship: Reimagining the Implementation of
Historical Treaties (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017).
77
See, e.g., Myeengun Henry, “First Nation questions relationship with Canada following
court ruling” Toronto Star (August 11, 2017), online: <https://www.thestar.com/opinion/
commentary/2017/08/11/first-nation-questions-relationship-with-canada-following.html>.
78
There are many co-management and joint management boards that have a role in wildlife
and resource decisions in Canada that have been created as a result of modern treaty or other
negotiated relationship instruments; see, e.g., the McKenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review
Board and the Haida Gwaii Management Council.
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identified above. Treaty relationships have broken down, and cannot be
repaired through project-based consultations with the Indigenous parties
in which the Crown is not even present. On the flipside, from the
perspective of state law, Canada’s authority has been described by the
Supreme Court as (only) de facto,79 interpreted by many to denote a
nascent or evolving quality to Canadian sovereignty, subject to or limited
by the de jure status of continuing Indigenous sovereignties, at least until
a point of reconciliation that may or may not be attainable in the
foreseeable future.80 Relatedly, as Webber argues, the concept of
sovereignty is not simply a historical fact; instead, the defining
characteristics of sovereignty include relationality and ongoing dispute, a
conceptualization that understands the Canadian state and Indigenous
Peoples to “still [be] seeking forms of relationship that are adequate to
our lives together.”81
However, this point of principle — one that potentially connects to
moments in prior jurisprudence that allowed for an openness in the
conception of state sovereignty — is not sustained by the doctrinal
directions in the 2017 cases. Those cases do not recognize the nation-tonation relationship or an open and disputed quality to Crown sovereignty
that might potentially be supported through a different version of the
reliance theory. The principles do not require the Crown to assess
particular regulatory processes, let alone nurture the treaty relationship
and discuss how to implement resource regulation with Indigenous
nations. Equally concerning from the perspective of the mainstream of
public law, the principles articulated do not require any action from the
legislature to address the implementation and administration of
Aboriginal and treaty rights. Contrary to the strong presumptions of
authority over constitutional questions emerging from Martin and Paul —
which, it should be noted, were followed by legislative action to
79

Haida Nation, supra, note 15, at para. 32.
See, e.g., Felix Hoehn, Reconciling Sovereignties: Aboriginal Nations and Canada
(Saskatoon: Native Law Centre, 2012) and Mark D. Walters, “The Morality of Aboriginal Law”
(2006) 31 Queen’s L.J. 470-520. See also Stacey, supra, note 7; Jeremy Webber, “We Are Still in
the Age of Encounter: Section 35 and a Canada Beyond Sovereignty” [hereinafter “Webber”] in
Patrick Macklem & Douglas Sanderson, eds., From Recognition to Reconciliation: Essays on the
Constitutional Entrenchment of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2016) [hereinafter “Macklem & Sanderson”]; Mark W. Walters, “Knots in the Bulrush: Law,
Sovereignty and Aboriginal Rights” in Macklem & Sanderson, id., at 40; Brian Slattery, “Aboriginal
Rights and the Honour of the Crown” (2005) 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) 433; and Ryan Beaton, “De Facto and
De Jure Crown Sovereignty: Reconciliation and Legitimation at the Supreme Court of Canada”
(2018) 27 Constitutional Forum Constitutionnel 25.
81
Webber, id., at 99.
80
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withdraw and reorganize constitutional jurisdictions in at least two
provinces82  the 2017 cases give the ability of the Crown to potentially
“fix” consultation conducted through regulatory process but do not set
any measures to assess Crown action or inaction in a given case apart
from whether the consultation was, on judicial review, reasonable. The
ability to retrospectively fix consultation through regulatory processes,
combined with a lack of accountability for the Crown’s obligation to
supervise or assess particular processes, is a recipe for government
inaction, especially legislative inaction, on the duty to consult and on
implementing and administering Aboriginal and treaty rights more
generally.
2. When Doré Met Haida Nation: Constitutional Rights, Values and
“Unformulaic” Analyses of Rights Claims
(a) Identifying Indigenous Difference
A second point of Indigenous difference can be identified when we
consider the judicial review principles that apply to ensure that where
a discretionary administrative decision limits Charter protections, the
impact is not disproportionate. This section will detail how the
Supreme Court’s approach in the 2017 cases both align with these
principles, as set out in Doré and Loyola, and departs from the more
developed (albeit still evolving) principles applied in that context that
are intended to ensure that constitutional rights are not impacted
disproportionately.
Above, the discussion focused on potential limitations to judicial
deference in relation to review of tribunal and Crown assessments of the
consultation process to ensure its adequacy. This is the third of three
points of analysis established in Haida Nation. The two questions that
precede the determination of whether the duty has been satisfied are: (1) has
the duty to consult been triggered? (2) what is the scope or content of the
duty? These two questions are questions of constitutional law, to date
82
Administrative Tribunals Act, S.B.C. 2004, c. 45, ss. 44-45; Administrative Procedures
and Jurisdiction Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. A-3, s. 11. It would be interesting to consider how to
empirically support an argument about what judicial review principles should be to prompt or
encourage governmental and legislative action to address such problems. In the absence of a stronger
empirical basis, my argument here is premised on the relatively strong response elicited by Martin
and the common law tradition of strong presumptions that the legislature can replace with explicit
language in statutes (see, e.g., Nicholson v. Haldimand-Norfolk (Regional) Police Commissioners,
[1979] S.C.J. No. 88, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 311 (S.C.C.)).
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assessed on a correctness standard, while the third question of adequacy
(satisfaction of the duty) is a matter more akin to administrative
discretion and, to date at least, assessed on a reasonableness standard.
Logically, questions 1 and 2 — whether the duty is triggered and the
scope of the duty — must be answered before question 3. Without such
attention, the level of consultation required remains undefined and the
standard of reasonableness, if applied to the final question of adequacy,
seeps into the first two questions. Even if correctness is not applied to the
first two questions distinctly, a decision that proceeds on an erroneous
assessment of the rights claimed and/or the impact of the proposed
conduct on those rights, would necessarily be unreasonable.83
In Clyde River, the Supreme Court accepted the scope of the duty as
deep, but in Chippewas of the Thames, the question of the scope of the
duty was not addressed by the NEB or the courts. And again, no mention
of the standard of review that applied to such questions, or any distinction
between a court’s role on review of the distinct questions was made. The
parties argued that a tribunal that has jurisdiction to assess the adequacy of
consultation must engage the analysis of the scope of the duty from Haida
Nation, an analysis that requires assessing the rights claimed and not
simply some generalized notion of Indigenous interests and environmental
impacts at stake in the projects. In Clyde River, the Supreme Court
provided a partial answer to these arguments when it considered that the
NEB’s failure to consider the impact of the seismic testing on the Inuit
treaty rights separately from the impact on the environment, also
contributed to the failure of the consultation process. In the Court’s words,
[T]he inquiry was misdirected. While the NEB found that the proposed
testing was not likely to cause significant adverse environmental effects,
and that any effects on traditional resource use could be addressed by
mitigation measures, the consultative inquiry is not properly into
environmental effects per se. Rather, it inquires into the impact on the
right. No consideration was given in the NEB’s environmental assessment
to the source — in a treaty — of the appellants’ rights to harvest marine
mammals, nor to the impact of the proposed testing on those rights.84
83

Da’naxda’xw/Awaetlala First Nation v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2011]
B.C.J. No. 887, 2011 BCSC 620 (B.C.S.C.) put it this way (at para. 147):
In my view, this is a situation where the Crown misconceived the impact of the
Minister’s decision, and … also misconceived the seriousness of the Da’naxda’xw’s
claim. No deference should be given to the government’s decision to determine the issue
under the 2010 Protected Area Policy. In these circumstances, the scope and adequacy of
the consultation should be reviewed on a standard of correctness.
84
Clyde River, supra, note 1, at para. 45 (emphasis in original).
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While this passage emphasizes that the articulation of the impact of a
project on rights as a distinct inquiry from the impact on the
environment, it is only a partial answer to the parties’ arguments because
the Court addresses this point in relation to the review of the process
(adequacy) of consultation, and not the assessment of the scope of the
duty.
Further, had the same approach been applied in Chippewas of the
Thames, the end result may not have changed, but the quality of the
conversation required would have been considerably improved. This is
because the Chippewas of the Thames First Nation claimed a number of
rights (detailed above), including title to the riverbed, but the nature of
these rights and strengths of the claims were not explored in the NEB’s
assessment decision nor in the judicial reviews that followed. As
Karakatsanis and Brown JJ. noted, “neither the NEB nor the Federal
Court of Appeal assessed the depth of consultation required in this
case.”85 The Supreme Court also did not engage in this analysis. Instead,
the Supreme Court, like the NEB, emphasized the minimal “footprint” of
the proposed project,86 and found the NEB’s hearing process and
Aboriginal engagement initiatives (including participant funding) and
mitigation measures required and committed to by the proponent
Enbridge, satisfied the duty to consult and accommodate. Consequently,
several of the First Nation’s rights claims were never addressed. This
implicitly sanctions a risk management strategy whereby consultations
and accommodations may exceed the requirements of the strict letter of
the law. One does not actually know what the law requires of the
proponent, a regulatory agency, or the Crown in these situations; only
that the duty may be satisfied without any party responding to
Indigenous concerns about the articulation of its scope. There may be
practical advantages to glossing over the assessment of rights and
impacts on rights in favour of richer consultation processes, particularly
for rights claimants who have weak claims or who lack the resources to
fully research and support their claims.87 Nevertheless, the risks of
rights-avoidance are well demonstrated in Chippewas of the Thames. Not
85

Chippewas of the Thames, supra, note 2, at para. 47.
National Energy Board, Reasons for Decision. In the matter of Enbridge Pipelines Inc.
Application dated 29 November 2012 for the Line 9B Reversal and Line 9 Capacity Expansion
Project, OH-002-2013 (March 2014) at 85-86, 97 [hereinafter “NEB Report, Line 9”].
87
For a related discussion of the pragmatics of “the creative use of ambiguity”, see Dwight
Newman, Revisiting the Duty to Consult Aboriginal Peoples (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2014),
at 169-71 [hereinafter “Newman, Revisiting”].
86

160

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2019) 88 S.C.L.R. (2d)

only does this approach damage the meaningful conversation that the
duty is intended to support, lack of attention to the impact on rights at
even the third step of assessing the adequacy of consultation meant no
attention to the difference between the title claim and traditional land use
rights emphasized by the NEB and the courts. As the Supreme Court said
in Tsilhqot’in Nation, “... Aboriginal title is a beneficial interest in the
land .... In simple terms, the title holders have the right to the benefits
associated with the land — to use it, enjoy it and profit from its
economic development.”88 A focus on impacts on rights requires
attention to the fact that a project with a small footprint has more obvious
impacts on the use and benefit of land than on resource use rights.
The partial answer from Clyde River regarding the obligation to
address section 35 rights (and its non-application in Chippewas of the
Thames) is rounded out by the Supreme Court’s statement that a
“formulaic ‘Haida analysis’” is not always required of the tribunal.89
This answer suggests that the constitutional rights at stake do not need to
be addressed as questions of constitutional law by a regulatory agency
with constitutional authority to assess the adequacy of consultation (as
per Martin, Paul and Carrier Sekani Tribal Council). Although
confusing at first — how can an authority delegated as a question of
constitutional law not be reviewed on the same basis90 — the Supreme
Court’s move away from treating constitutional questions that arise in the
course of exercises of administrative discretion is in many ways
consistent with the treatment of Charter rights and values as articulated
in Doré, Loyola, and most recently, Law Society of British Columbia v.
Trinity Western University.91 The consistency is found in that, like in the
2017 cases, a reviewing court does not require that tribunals perform the
Oakes justification analysis as a court would under the Doré/Loyola
framework. To do so would be to impose court-like standards on
sometimes very different administrative bodies, and risk opening the
door to too much court intervention in administrative decisions. An
overly interventionist court on judicial review is not respectful of
legislative intent to delegate matters to administrative agencies in the
first place, and this includes interventions on matters implicating Charter
88
Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2014] S.C.J. No. 44, 2014 SCC 44, [2014] 2
S.C.R. 257, at para. 70 (S.C.C.) (citation omitted) [hereinafter “Tsilhqot’in Nation”].
89
Chippewas of the Thames, supra, note 2, at para. 63; Clyde River, supra, note 1, at para. 42.
90
Recall that in Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, supra, note 27, the authority to assess
adequacy depends on authority over questions of law.
91
[2018] S.C.J. No. 32, 2018 SCC 32 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “LSBC v. TWU”].
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rights, particularly in administrative contexts where Charter rights are part
and parcel of daily tribunal decisions.92 In other words, the invocation and
presence of Charter rights within an administrative context does not
transform the administrative context, nor usurp the significance of
administrative expertise. Instead, constitutional rights and values require
attention and respect from administrative decision-makers as part of their
role in administering law and justice in the Canadian state. This is achieved
under Doré by aligning the reasonableness standard with the section 1
Oakes93 justification test to ensure that decision-makers have proportionally
balanced “the relevant Charter value with the statutory objectives”.94
At first glance, such logic applies equally well in Aboriginal rights
and duty to consult contexts, in which boards such as the NEB and other
environmental decision-makers that regularly recommend or approve or
permit projects that will impact Indigenous Peoples’ lands, waters and
land uses (and therefore, have probable impacts on Aboriginal and treaty
rights). Moreover, as set out in Clyde River, even where deep
consultation and reasons are required, the reasons do not have to be
explicit “in every case. The degree of consideration that is appropriate
will depend on the circumstances of each case.”95 This point was further
elaborated in Chippewas of the Thames, which set out the requirement as
“an indication that the [agency] took the asserted Aboriginal and treaty
rights into consideration and accommodated them where appropriate.”96
These points are also, at first glance, entirely consistent with Supreme
Court articulations in Charter contexts, such as in LSBC v. TWU, in
which reasons were not required of a decision-maker that used a
referendum process of decision. Instead, the whole record can be
examined to ensure that proportionate balancing was attended to in the
decision process.97 Under Doré and Loyola, it is the whole decision that
must satisfy the reasonableness standard, an approach that takes account
of and respects diverse administrative contexts with valuable expertise
by requiring judicial flexibility with respect to the form and specificity of
the reasoning, even in relation to the justification of infringements of
Charter rights.
92
For example, parole boards as discussed in Doré, supra, note 9, at para. 51, citing David Mullan,
“Administrative Tribunals and Judicial Review of Charter Issues after Multani” (2006) 21 N.J.C.L. 127.
93
R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.).
94
Doré, supra, note 9, at para. 58. See also McLachlin C.J.C.’s concurring reasons in LSBC v.
TWU, supra, note 89, at para. 114 and critical and clarifying notes on the framework at paras. 115-119.
95
Clyde River, supra, note 1, at para. 42.
96
Supra, note 2, at para. 63.
97
LSBC v. TWU, supra, note 91, at paras. 55-56.
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Thus, even without citations to Doré and Loyola, the stipulation in the
2017 cases that a “formulaic” rights-based Haida Nation analysis is not
required might be seen as a meeting of the jurisprudence from Haida
Nation and the Doré line of cases. However, it is only a passing
resemblance, and the merger of these approaches far from complete.
Upon further examination, by not addressing the distinct points of
analysis involved in the middle question of scope, and assessing only the
pragmatic end-point of the adequacy of the process, the Supreme Court set
a course that again marks a point of Indigenous difference in public law.
First, the analytic framework in the Charter context identifies a
threshold step of determining whether a Charter protection has been
limited before the proportionality analysis is engaged. As the majority in
LSBC v. TWU reiterated, “the preliminary question is whether the
administrative decision engages the Charter by limiting Charter
protections – both rights and values”.98 The majority does not specify
what this step involves, but in her concurring reasons, McLachlin C.J.C.,
presses on to suggest clarifications to the Doré/Loyola framework,
including that a “decision based on an erroneous interpretation of a
Charter right will be unreasonable.”99 Studiously avoiding the language
of preliminary questions and correctness review, McLachlin C.J.C.
emphasizes that there must be consistency in interpretation of
constitutional rights regardless of whether it is courts or executive actors
who are deciding whether a right has been limited or violated by
government conduct. It is also a point that closely tracks McLachlin
C.J.C.’s statement in Haida Nation (at least once one takes into account
the evolution of standard of review since 2004), where she stated, that
“[s]hould the government misconceive the seriousness of the claim or
impact of the infringement, this question of law would likely be judged
by correctness.”100 This threshold step of ensuring the breach of any
rights or impacts on values at stake have been properly identified,
however, is not present or required in the 2017 cases. It may be true that
the Supreme Court saw no relevance or found no consensus to pursuing
this analysis in Chippewas of the Thames, having been persuaded that the
final outcome in that case was fair. Nevertheless, jumping over the
distinct treatment of the right demonstrates the concern raised by critics
98

Id., at para. 58.
Id., at para. 116. See also Liston, supra, note 9, at 233.
100
Supra, note 15, at para. 63. Relatedly, McLachlin C.J.C. also stated in Haida Nation that
“one cannot ‘meaningfully discuss accommodation or justification of a right unless one has some
idea of the core of that right and its modern scope’” (at para. 36, citation omitted).
99
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of Doré/Loyola:101 One cannot know if the impact on a right is
proportional and therefore that a decision is reasonable if the constitutional
interests at stake have not been fully and properly identified.
Second, the lack of a threshold analysis focusing on the constitutional
protections at stake in the 2017 cases is not only out of step with the
Charter jurisprudence, it is also out of step with a growing line of lower
court decisions that clearly require the Crown to carry out a preliminary
assessment of rights. As the Federal Court said in Enge v. Canada
(Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development): “The failure of
the Crown to conduct a preliminary assessment of the strength of an
Aboriginal claim, to determine the scope of the consultation required,
and to discuss its preliminary assessment with the Aboriginal group in
question can itself be a breach of the duty to consult.”102 And as the
Ontario Superior Court stated in Saugeen First Nation v. Ontario
(Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry): “The Crown was obliged
to do an initial assessment. This is a requirement of constitutional stature.
... ‘Scoping’ is also a requirement of constitutional stature.”103 In these
cases, this constitutional requirement sits with the Crown, and is specific
to particular consultations. If this obligation is not automatically
delegated to agencies with their responsibilities over the duty to consult,
and if the Crown, as ultimately responsible, is not required to specifically
assess the scope of the duty (as discussed in the previous section), the
potential for the Crown to evade its constitutional obligations through
delegation is enlarged yet goes unremarked upon in the 2017 cases.104
Alternatively, perhaps the reliance framework demarcates a different role
for the Crown “proper”, setting directions for Aboriginal administrative
law that are markedly different from the direction since Dunsmuir to treat
all administrative decision-makers exercising statutory authorities
through the same lens and principles.105
101
See, e.g., authors noted at supra, note 9. See also the separate concurring judgments of
McLachlin C.J.C. and Rowe J. in LSBC v. TWU, supra, note 91.
102
[2017] F.C.J. No. 963, 2017 FC 932, at para. 210 (F.C.), citing West Moberly First
Nations v. British Columbia (Ministry of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources), [2011] B.C.J.
No. 942, 2011 BCCA 247, at para. 113 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “West Moberly First Nations
BCCA”]. This approach builds upon Stratas and Dawson JJ.A.’s comments in Gitxaala Nation,
supra, note 58, at paras. 308-309. See also Kwakiutl First Nation v. North Island Central Coast
Forest District, [2015] B.C.J. No. 1605, 2015 BCCA 345 (B.C.C.A.).
103
[2017] O.J. No. 3701, 2017 ONSC 3456, at para. 54 (Ont. Div. Ct.).
104
Avoidance of constitutional responsibilities through delegation is a key concern in the
Charter jurisprudence. See Blencoe, supra, note 48 and Godbout, supra, note 48.
105
See, e.g., Agraira v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), [2013] S.C.J.
No. 36, 2013 SCC 36, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 559 (S.C.C.).
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A further point of Indigenous difference in the 2017 cases is
highlighted by turning our attention to matters of significant debate in the
Charter context — how and whether the “unformuliac” approach to
proportionality under the Doré/Loyola framework provides for a
sufficiently rigorous protection of Charter rights. This framework has
been repeatedly criticized, including concerns that review of decisions
for “implicating” Charter values that allow a rights analysis to be
avoided will lead to diluted and weaker rights protections.106
Commentators who are more optimistic about this framework note that
Charter values are distinct from rights and already circumscribe
administrative discretion, and further that it extends the policy of the
accessibility of Charter rights by demanding that tribunals attend to
proportionality in their decisions potentially even before a breach of a
Charter right has been alleged.107 The commentary was directly
addressed in LSBC v. TWU. The majority reiterated the ability to achieve
a “robust proportionality” analysis under the reasonableness standard:
The framework set out in Doré and Loyola is not a weak or watered
down version of proportionality — rather, it is a robust one. … [T]he
reviewing court must be satisfied that the decision proportionately
balances [the statutory objectives with the Charter protection], that is,
that it ‘gives effect, as fully as possible to the Charter protections at
stake given the particular statutory mandate’ (Loyola, at para 39). Put
another way, the Charter protection must be ‘affected as little as
reasonably possible’ in light of the applicable statutory objectives
(Loyola, at para 40). When a decision engages the Charter,
reasonableness and proportionality become synonymous. Simply put, a
decision that has a disproportionate impact on Charter rights is not
reasonable.108

The dissenting judges, Brown and Côté JJ. were blunt in their
disagreement, suggesting the debate reinforces their preference for
applying the tried and true Oakes test “to justify state infringements of
Charter rights, regardless of the context in which they occur.”109 Chief
Justice McLachlin and Rowe J. both provided their own concurring
reasons in which they agreed with the premises of Doré, but suggested a
106

Macklin, supra, note 9. Other criticisms have included the onus on the party to
demonstrate reasonableness, which reverses the onus in the court-based approach.
107
Liston, supra, note 9 comments on the potential obligation on agencies to consider
Charter values even when not raised by the parties. See also Sossin & Friedman, supra, note 9 and
Fox-Decent & Pless, supra, note 9.
108
Supra, note 91, at para. 80 (emphasis in original).
109
Id., at para. 304.

(2019) 88 S.C.L.R. (2d)

DELEGATION, DEFERENCE AND DIFFERENCE

165

number of refinements to the analytical approach aimed at ensuring that
the protection of Charter rights in administrative decisions is not lesser
than the protection in relation to legislative action, including drawing a
clear line between the notion of a Charter right and a Charter value.110
The recent LSBC v. TWU decision demonstrates that approach to
incorporating and reviewing Charter protections in administrative
discretion is still a livewire.111 With such debate raging, it is odd and
possibly ill-advised to point out how much better the Doré/Loyola
framework is than what emerged from the 2017 cases with respect to
section 35 protections, at least when it comes to protecting the “rightsquality” of the constitutional rights at stake. But in pursuit of identifying
and understanding Indigenous differences in public law, I press on.
Where the Doré/Loyola framework at least calls for a rigorous approach
to the reasonableness standard, such that proportionality merges with
reasonableness, the 2017 cases do not even use the word proportionality
nor is there any analogizing to the justification analysis in section 35
contexts. Indeed, the Court does not get close to describing or calling for
a robust approach to the reasonableness standard where an Aboriginal
rights protection is implicated (otherwise known as when the duty to
consult has been triggered). As noted above, the Court did not mention
the reasonableness standard in the cases at all, making it awkward to
have a discussion of what the reasonableness standard means in this
context. One might argue that the proportionality inherent in the Haida
Nation duty to consult — that consultation and accommodation
obligations increase with the strength of the rights claim in issue and
potential adverse impact on the rights — was evidenced in the
Chippewas of the Thames decision, as a whole. As the NEB stated, and
the Supreme Court repeated, the proposed Line 9 project would occur
within Enbridge’s existing right of way, resulting in small likelihood of
impacts on the “rights and interests” of Aboriginal groups.112 In other
words, the decision-maker (and the Supreme Court) viewed the project
as having only a small “footprint” on the land, with low stakes for
Indigenous rights-holders and project mitigation measures adopted to
address those stakes. However, as argued above, without specifying the
110

Id., at paras. 111-119, per McLachlin C.J.C. and paras. 162-208, per Rowe J.
Leonid Sirota, for example, calls the majority decision a “catastrophe” in his swift and
strongly worded blog: “The Supreme Court v the Rule of Law. In ruling against Trinity Western’s
fundamentalist law school, the Supreme Court unleashes the administrative state” (June 18, 2018),
online: <https://doubleaspect.blog/2018/06/18/the-supreme-court-v-the-rule-of-law/>.
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Chippewas of the Thames, supra, note 2, at para. 23.
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rights at stake, one cannot know how relevant the fact of a project
occurring on already disturbed lands might be to its impact on those who
use or own (or claim to own) those lands, or the measures required to
address minimal impairment of the right. The gap between the Charter
context created by not requiring a threshold assessment of the limitations
on section 35 protections (in the Haida Nation analysis of scope), is thus
augmented by the lack of any consideration of what a robust
proportionality analysis akin to a justification test is required in the
assessment of the adequacy of the consultation process.
(b) Explaining and Evaluating Difference
The lack of attention to the nature of a rigorous proportionality
analysis in relation to section 35 rights protections becomes more stark
when one observes that Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames
involved treaty rights, modern and historic respectively. Unlike the
Aboriginal rights at stake in Haida Nation, treaty rights are not
“claimed” or “unproven” at law. As Binnie J. wrote for the Court in
Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage),
regarding historic treaties, “the Crown, as a party, will always have
notice of its contents.”113 Having notice of treaty contents in no way
precludes debate about the scope and application of those treaty rights, or
whether they are infringed in a given case.114 But there should be no
debate that at least the harvesting rights at stake in the 2017 cases were
the subject of fully formed constitutionally protected, section 35 rights. If
this is correct, then the discussion in the 2017 cases might be expected to
focus on aligning reasonableness review with the justification of
infringement test required in relation to treaty rights. In other words, the
2017 cases were an occasion to consider the merger of the Sparrow115
and R. v. Badger116 cases on justification with the Doré/Loyola
framework.
In Sparrow, a seminal early section 35 case, the parties were able to
agree at the Supreme Court that the Musqueam, a fishing people, had
fishing rights as an Indigenous People. The case instead focused on
113
[2005] S.C.J. No. 71, 2005 SCC 69, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 388, at para. 34 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Mikisew Cree”].
114
For discussion, see supra, note 71.
115
Supra, note 17.
116
[1996] S.C.J. No. 39, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Badger”]. See also R. v.
Marshall, [1999] S.C.J. No. 66, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533 (S.C.C.).
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whether those rights had been extinguished prior to 1982 and, given the
Court’s finding that they had not been extinguished, whether the fishing
regulations in question unjustifiably infringed Ronald Sparrow’s section 35
fishing rights.117 In articulating the justification of infringement test, the
Court borrowed heavily from section 1 of the Charter and the Oakes test in
spite of no equivalent language existing under the text of section 35.118
The test that emerged has evolved into a proportionality test, including
key elements that overlap with the Oakes test to weigh legislative
objectives against impacts on the rights to ensure that the honour of the
Crown is substantively (and not just procedurally) upheld before an
infringement of a section 35 right could be justified. Elements that are
specific to the section 35 context were also articulated in Sparrow,119
including consultation with respect to the accommodations required;120
Indigenous priority with respect to at least subsistence or food, social and
ceremonial harvesting rights; and, compensation in appropriate
circumstances. In spite of these differences, assessment of government
actions in the justification of infringement under section 35 has often
aligned with section 1 approaches, including the satisfaction of the
honour of the Crown standard through a lens of “reasonableness”.121 The
extension of section 1 proportionality was furthered in Badger when
the Supreme Court adapted the test from Sparrow to allow for justified
117

For commentary, see Brian Slattery, “Understanding Aboriginal and Treaty Rights”
(2000) 79 Can. Bar Rev. 196; W.I.C. Binnie, “The Sparrow Doctrine: Beginning of the End or End
of the Beginning?” (1990) 15 Queen’s L.J. 217.
118
On the justification test as proportionality, see Mark D. Walters, “Respecting Deference
as Respect: Rights, Reasonableness and Proportionality in Canadian Administrative Law” in Hanna
Wilberg & Mark Elliott, eds., The Scope and Intensity of Substantive Review: Traversing Taggart’s
Rainbow (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015) 395 at 401-402, regarding Sparrow, Dwight Newman,
“The Limitation of Rights: A Comparative Evolution and Ideology of the Oakes and Sparrow Tests”
(1999) 62 Sask. L. Rev. 543.
119
The analysis from Sparrow also does not allow the same breadth of “public interest” objectives
to justify an infringement of a s. 35 right as might be possible under a s. 1 Charter analysis (as applied by
Vickers J. in Williams v. British Columbia, [2007] B.C.J. No. 1291, 2007 BCSC 853 (B.C.S.C.)).
However, broader public interest objectives have been held to potentially ground a justification of an
infringement of an Aboriginal title right or a commercial scale harvesting right: Delgamuukw, supra, note 17;
Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 88, and R. v. Gladstone, [1996] S.C.J. No. 79, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723 (S.C.C.).
120
It should be noted that other Charter rights with collective dimensions involve
consultation obligations in the accommodation process and subsequent justification analysis; for
example, see the freedom of association cases: British Columbia Teachers’ Federation v. British
Columbia, [2016] S.C.J. No. 49, [2016] 2 S.C.R. 407 (S.C.C.) and Health Services and Support –
Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, [2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R.
391 (S.C.C.). For discussion, see Peter Carver, "Comparing Aboriginal and Other Duties to Consult
in Canadian Law" (2012) 49 Alta. L. Rev. 855.
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R. v. Nikal, [1996] S.C.J. No. 47, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 1013, at para. 110 (S.C.C.).
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infringements of treaty rights.122 Following Haida Nation, there has been
some confusion regarding the relationship between these two
frameworks and particularly whether the consultation obligation was one
and the same. In 2014, Tsilhqot’in Nation provided clarification that in
some cases additional consultation would be required following
recognition of a “claimed right” as an actual constitutional right.
Tsilhqot’in Nation further confirmed that governments must justify any
infringement of an Aboriginal right to a strict standard, noting the
fiduciary duty that applied to the title right in issue in that case.123
Recent appellate level cases, on the other hand, have suggested that
the justification of infringement test is no longer available to Indigenous
treaty parties in the context of regulatory processes. Treaty 8 First
Nations, for example, argued that both the Federal and Provincial
Crowns had an obligation to consider the infringement of their treaty
rights before approving the Site C dam in the Peace River Valley.124 In
that environmental impact assessment process, the terms of reference for
the joint federal and provincial review panel explicitly prohibited the
Panel from commenting on scope of the Treaty rights in issue and their
infringement.125 Both provincial and federal courts of appeal declined to
find the approving ministers and cabinet responsible for determining
more than the adequacy of consultation in the context of the
environmental impact review.126 In reaching these conclusions, both
courts analyzed the statutory context with reference to Paul, commenting
on the Crown’s non-adjudicative function, lack of fact finding role, and
lack of a proper evidentiary record and fact finding role in these
122

For a critique of this extension, see Leonard I. Rotman, “Defining Parameters: Aboriginal
Rights, Treaty Rights, and the Sparrow Justificatory Test” (1997) 36 Alta. L. Rev. 149.
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The relevance of the discussion of the justification test in Tsilhqot’in Nation to other
Aboriginal rights (i.e., not title claims) is a matter of some uncertainty. For related discussion, see
Peter Hogg & Daniel Styler, “Statutory Limitation of Aboriginal or Treaty rights: What Counts as
Justification?” (2015-2016) 1 Lakehead L.J. 3.
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Prophet River FCA, supra, note 58; Prophet River BCCA, supra, note 58.
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Prophet River First Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Environment), [2015] B.C.J. No.
2026, 2015 BCSC 1682, at para. 35 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “Prophet River BCSC”]: “2.5 The Joint
Review Panel will not make any conclusions or recommendations as to: (a) the nature and scope of
asserted Aboriginal rights or the strength of those asserted rights; (b) the scope of the Crown’s duty to
consult Aboriginal Groups; (c) whether the Crown has met its duty to consult Aboriginal Groups …; (d)
whether the Project is an infringement of Treaty No. 8; and (e) any matter of treaty interpretation.”
126
This finding does not preclude the need for the Crown to conduct a preliminary assessment of
the rights and the potential adverse impact on the rights to assess whether consultation was adequate in
relation to the scope of the obligations, under the Haida Nation analysis as opposed to a treaty rights
analysis. In these cases, this point was not contentious as deep consultation obligations were admitted and
consultation and accommodation measures followed and offered matched that assessment.
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processes,127 factors that are part of the Martin and Paul frameworks for
determining whether a decision-maker has implied authority over
constitutional questions.128 But the Federal Court of Appeal went further,
describing an evolution in the case law whereby the Supreme Court has
“moved away from” the justification of infringement framework under
Sparrow to a framework of dialogue about claimed rights under Haida
Nation,129 and commenting that the Treaty 8 parties were “in reality
inviting the Court to revert to the pre-Haida Nation case law.
Specifically, they contend that claimed rights or treaty rights ought to be
adjudicated by the GIC every time an infringement is alleged by an
Aboriginal group.”130 It was sufficient in the Prophet River case to decide
on the basis of no implied authority over the constitutional questions in
issue, but these comments go further and read as an attack on the logic of
accessibility of constitutional rights, under Paul and Martin.
There are further problems raised by the discussion in Prophet River at
the Federal Court, and in the adoption of reliance approach in the 2017
cases. First, the logic of Haida Nation overtaking the justification analysis
is over-extended if applied beyond the “taking up” clauses in issue in
Prophet River. The taking up clauses are common to the numbered treaties,
and permit the Crown to take up lands within treaty settlement areas for
settlement and development, but not in an unlimited manner.131 In
extending the Haida Nation duty to consult and accommodate to treaty
rights in Mikisew Cree, the Supreme Court was addressing the
implementation of these clauses in the treaties specifically:
127
Prophet River FCA, supra, note 58, at para. 78; Prophet River BCCA, supra, note 58, at
paras. 22-23 and 27-28.
128
Martin, supra, note 12, at para. 48; Paul, supra, note 14, at para. 39. These cases raise
issues of the constitutionality of removing constitutional jurisdictions through intergovernmental
agreements under legislation, particularly when the authority to consider the constitutional questions
at stake do not rest with a later decision-maker either. For discussion, see Lambert, supra, note 10.
And as these cases played out, further access to adjudication of the issues is then denied through
judicial review, requiring bifurcation of the proceedings — an approach that has generally been
discouraged in relation to Charter matters (Conway, supra, note 12, at para. 79), but the possibility
of which has been recognized in the s. 35 context (Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, supra, note 27, at
paras. 62-63).
129
Prophet River FCA, supra, note 58, at para. 34.
130
Id., at para. 57 (emphasis added).
131
See, for example, the text from Treaty 8: the signatory Indians “shall have right to pursue their
usual vocations of hunting, trapping and fishing throughout the tract surrendered as heretofore described,
subject to such regulations as may from time to time be made by the Government of the country, acting
under the authority of Her Majesty, and saving and excepting such tracts as may be required or taken up
from time to time for settlement, mining, lumbering, trading or other purposes.” Online:
<http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100028813/1100100028853#chp4>. For discussion, see Shin
Imai, “Treaty Lands and Crown Obligations: The ‘Tracts Taken Up’ Provision” (2001) 27 Queen’s L.J. 1.

170

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2019) 88 S.C.L.R. (2d)

[N]ot every subsequent “taking up” by the Crown constituted an
infringement of Treaty 8 that must be justified according to the test set
out in Sparrow. In Sparrow, it will be remembered, the federal
government’s fisheries regulations infringed the aboriginal fishing right,
and had to be strictly justified. This is not the same situation as we have
here, where the aboriginal rights have been surrendered and extinguished,
and the Treaty 8 rights are expressly limited to lands not “required or
taken up from time to time for settlement, mining, lumbering, trading or
other purposes” (emphasis added). The language of the treaty could not
be clearer in foreshadowing change. Nevertheless the Crown was and is
expected to manage the change honourably.132

In Mikisew Cree, the Supreme Court was equally clear that “... [i]f the
time comes that in the case of a particular Treaty 8 First Nation ‘no
meaningful right to hunt’ remains over its traditional territories, the
significance of the oral promise that ‘the same means of earning a
livelihood would continue after the treaty as existed before it’ would
clearly be in question, and a potential action for treaty infringement,
including the demand for a Sparrow justification, would be a legitimate
First Nation response.”133 The 2017 cases, however, do not fit with this
line of cases: the treaty rights at stake are different. The historic treaties
signed by the ancestors of the Chippewas of the Thames are older and at
least the recorded text is of a significantly different character than the
post-Confederation numbered treaties, often described as resembling real
estate transactions.134 The constitutional rights at stake in Clyde River are
defined under the NCLA, and include harvesting and stewardship
rights.135 While the Crown’s responsibilities to implement and administer
both sets of treaties are subject to the honour of the Crown,136 such
132

Supra, note 113, at para. 31 (emphasis in original).
Id., at para. 48.
134
J.R. Miller, Compact, Contract, Covenant: Aboriginal Treaty-Making in Canada
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009). On their website, the Chippewas of the Thames First
Nation list the following as their treaties: The Longwoods Treaty of 1822 (which they note has three
written versions); The London Township Treaty of 1796; The Sombra Treaty of 1796; Treaty #29 of
1827; and The McKee Treaty of 1790 (online: <http://www.cottfn.com/chief-council/our-history/>).
A version of the English text of some of these treaties is available online from the Government of
Canada: <https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1370372152585/1370372222012>. There are no “taking up”
clauses in the written text.
135
Supra, note 20.
136
Regarding the honour of the Crown applying to modern treaties, see Little
Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, supra, note 28; regarding the honour of the Crown applying the
implementation of treaties and other solemn Crown commitments to Indigenous Peoples, see
Manitoba Metis Federation v. Canada (Attorney General), [2013] S.C.J. No. 14, 2013 SCC 14,
[2013] 1 S.C.R. 623 (S.C.C.).
133
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responsibilities cannot rewrite the Constitution and “overtake” the nature
of the interests at stake as constitutional rights. As constitutional rights,
these interests are prioritized and restrain both government decisions and
legislative acts. The proportionality of the duty to consult analysis set out
in Haida Nation was never intended to usurp the justification analysis.
Both have their role in protecting section 35 rights and claimed rights.137
The issue of concern highlighted by the 2017 cases (as well as the Prophet
River litigation), however, is the relative inaccessibility of the rights
framework,138 and the lack of discussion of merging the justification
analysis with the reasonableness standard in the context of section 35 rights
as is occurring with respect to Charter protections.
A merged approach to justification of infringement and reasonableness
analysis in the context of section 35 may raise as many concerns as it
does in the context of Charter rights. Nevertheless, it would improve the
“rights quality” of section 35 protections in two ways. First, as discussed
above and in parallel to the related Charter framework, it would ensure
that there would be a distinct analysis of the right (or claimed right)
before the proportionality analysis takes place. As argued above,
Haida Nation also requires this type of analysis in relation to the
constitutional questions involved in determining the scope of the duty to
consult and accommodate (preliminary assessment of the preliminary
strength of the rights, and the seriousness of any potential impact) and
would satisfy this step if it were treated as a threshold analysis on
judicial review (if not also required of a tribunal). But where established
treaty rights are in issue, and the issue is one of the “disputed” nature and
scope of the rights rather than a claim to a right not yet established at
law, the situation is not akin to the treaty issues to which the Haida
Nation analysis was applied in Mikisew Cree. The situation is instead
akin to that in LSBC v. TWU, in which the nature and degree of
infringement of a Charter right was disputed and analyzed before the
proportionality of the impact of the Law Society’s decision was assessed
leaning heavily on the final two steps of Oakes. Translating this analysis
into the treaty rights contexts at stake in Chippewas of the Thames and
Clyde River, and to properly introduce Doré to Sparrow, a proportionality
analysis would need to be considered in relation to the statutory
objectives at stake, in relation to the concepts of minimal impairment and
137
The relationship between the Haida and Sparrow frameworks was recently revisited by
the Supreme Court in Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 88.
138
For related commentary, see Borrows, supra, note 7; and, Stacey, supra, note 7, at 437.
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Indigenous priority harvesting (with respect to non-commercial activities
at least), and in relation to the quality of the consultation process that
proceeded the breach.139 There is overlap with the analysis under Haida
Nation, since consultation and mitigation measures/conditions adopted in
response are considered and address, at least partially, two of the
justification elements. Further, both justification of infringement and
consultation are measured against standards required to satisfy the
honour of the Crown. Nevertheless, a focus on justifying a breach of
treaty rights extends the concept of the honour of the Crown at stake
beyond the narrowness of a duty to consult, which demands only that a
meaningful conversation occur.140 The honour of the Crown in relation to
the justification analysis engages treaty interpretation principles in
defining the right and its breach, as well as the Crown’s obligations to
honourably implement and administer treaties, giving rise to a higher
standard of conduct expected and one that directly engages the treaty
relationship rather than just an isolated conversation about one project.141
Thus instead of this engagement with the evolving Charter law, the 2017
cases adopt only the weakest aspects of the Charter frameworks and
leave section 35 protections on a different track, one that leaves
Indigenous parties and observers wondering where one might find and
realize the rights protections promised under section 35 of the
Constitution.

IV. CONCLUSIONS
Indigenous difference in relation to the treatment of section 35
protections on judicial review is stark. Constitutional questions and
responsibilities are not delegated by the legislature to administrative
139

For a recent discussion of the justification test, see Ahoushat Indian Band v. Canada
(Attorney General), [2018] B.C.J. No. 717, 2018 BCSC 633 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “Ahoushat”].
140
Clyde River, supra, note 1; West Moberly First Nations BCCA, supra, note 102.
141
In relation to title, where the fiduciary duty is engaged once Aboriginal title is proven, the
Supreme Court described the difference between the obligation in consultation versus justification as
follows:
Where Aboriginal title is unproven, the Crown owes a procedural duty imposed by the
honour of the Crown to consult and, if appropriate, accommodate the unproven Aboriginal
interest. By contrast, where title has been established, the Crown must not only comply with
its procedural duties, but must also ensure that the proposed government action is
substantively consistent with the requirements of s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. This
requires both a compelling and substantial governmental objective and that the government
action is consistent with the fiduciary duty owed by the Crown to the Aboriginal group.
Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 88, at para. 80.
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actors, but rather the Crown can rely on administrative agencies to fulfil
its unique constitutional obligations. The lack of attention to rigorous
proportionality and the modification of justification tests to suit
administrative contexts cannot be explained by the existence of an
“obligations” framework under Haida Nation, unless one accepts that
disputed Aboriginal and treaty rights do not have the status of
constitutional rights. Furthermore, the logic of the accessibility of
enforcement and adjudication of these rights has not been centred as an
important and motivating policy direction. As I set out at the beginning
of this paper, my aim is to question whether there are principles that can
explain and ground these differences, and whether there are good reasons
for identifying alternative approaches to section 35 rights. In my view,
the differences identified above cannot be justified. Although the Crownreliance model might be rooted in treaty relationships and previous cases
that nod towards ongoing and disputed Crown sovereignty, ultimate
Crown responsibility for consultation as articulated in the 2017 cases
does not correspond with such roots and directions. In any event, a
different path is not warranted. Section 35 protections are simply not that
different from Charter rights. They may be motivated by different aspects
of the history of the state, with section 35 being rooted in a long
Indigenous and colonial history in North America and the Charter being
rooted in the evolution of individual rights and liberties in British, French
and Euro-Canadian traditions.142 Their political and potentially
redistributive nature may require courts to be cautious of over-reaching
to dictate potential negotiated resolutions and settlements of rights
disputes.143 Nevertheless, the protections against state action, and the
142
There are, of course, other differences between s. 35 and the Charter to consider. For
example, the text is quite different, with s. 35 being very bare compared to the Charter. These textual
differences, however, have been negated by judicial importations of Charter approaches into s. 35.
One might also identify s. 35 rights as collectively held, in contrast to the individual nature of
Charter rights. However, this views Charter rights too narrowly, ignoring the collective nature of
some Charter rights (e.g., s. 2(d), s. 23) and the actively discussed collective nature of other Charter
rights (s. 15, s. 2(a), for example). More importantly, however, the issues at stake in this discussion
are structural and about how constitutional rights are implemented and administered by the state.
The form of the constitutional protection is more important than the qualities of the rights
themselves. Both s. 35 and the Charter are constitutional rights and that must guide and bind
government action, and so the argument is that the framework of analysis should be the same
(subject to a principled basis for difference).
143
As B.C.S.C. judge Humphries J. said recently in her decision on the lack of justification
for infringements of commercial fishing rights,
I have made a series of findings in respect of unjustified infringements, but the result is
not a workable fishery ready to be implemented, because, as I must emphasize, the court
cannot design a fishery. The task of allocating fishery resources belongs to the
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state privilege to limit rights in a proportionate manner in favour of
broader collective interests, take the same form.
If Haida Nation; Sparrow; Doré and Oakes were brought into
conversation with each other, there is potential to advance not only the
coherence across areas of public law, but also ongoing debates about how
judicial review conceives of and supports the role of the administrative
branch in the implementation and administration of constitutional rights.
For example, one of the most contentious points in the debates about the
Doré/Loyola framework is it embraces both Charter rights and Charter
values. In concurring reasons in LSBC v. TWU for example, Rowe J.
advocated for a strict differentiation of values from rights, reasoning that
the former come into play where the Charter has no direct application
and play “a supporting role in the adjudication of Charter claims” but
“have no independent function in the administrative context. ... When
courts review administrative decisions for compliance with the Charter,
Charter rights must be the focus of the inquiry — not Charter values.”144
The majority, by contrast, insist that a proportionality analysis is engaged
through the reasonableness standard when an administrative decision
“engages the Charter by limiting Charter protections — both rights and
values”.145 As the majority conceives the matter, Charter protections are
broader if values are included. As the concurring and dissenting judges
conceive of the matter, the broader approach risks the dilution of Charter
rights because it is unclear when it is a right or a value at stake, and
including both creates uncertainty regarding the issues at stake.
These debates should travel back and forth to the section 35 context,
with adaptations and insights from the language of section 35 disputes.
The responsibilities arising from “rights claims” in Haida Nation map
remarkably well onto Charter values, and attendant debates. Charter
values have been described as “inchoate”,146 and subject to further
evolution and development. The rights claims at stake in Haida Nation
are similarly inchoate, and subject to both further evolution and
development. In Haida Nation, however, an eventual point of
determination is foreseen as part of the structure of the pre-proof
government. … There is much work still to be done by the Department of Fisheries and
Oceans … and by the plaintiffs.
Ahoushat, supra, note 139, at para. 12. The need to work with rights-holders to achieve
their accommodation and the need for courts to be cautious with respect to budgetary implications of
their decisions is of course not unique to the s. 35 context.
144
Supra, note 91, at paras. 166-170.
145
Id., at para. 58.
146
Sossin & Friedman, supra, note 9.
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obligations of government to respect these rights as claims. The value of
this obligation is thus prospective. As Binnie J. described in Little
Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, “Haida Nation attempted to head off
such confrontations [over the consequences of rights infringements] by
imposing on the parties a duty to consult and (if appropriate)
accommodate” where impacts on claims that may become rights are
apparent.147 Charter values also, minimally, provide prospective guidance
in administrative decision-making. Indeed, in relation to adjudicative and
other discretionary decisions, a breach of a right cannot usually be
established until the decision has been made. As the Supreme Court
defined in Baker, administrative discretion “must be exercised in
accordance with the boundaries imposed in the statute, the principles of
the rule of law, the principles of administrative law, the fundamental
values of Canadian society, and the principles of the Charter.”148 Thus,
both section 35 and Charter protections have meaning and offer direction
to administrative decision-makers before there is a decision that arguably
breaches a constitutional right. And as in Baker and Clyde River, judicial
review on the basis of values or “potential” rights claims may, in some
cases, be sufficient to provide the necessary remedy.149
The difficulty with values and prospective rights is in ensuring that a
party has access to adjudication of their constitutional rights where the
constitutional weight of a potential right or a guiding value does not
provide a remedy, and obscures a dispute about the violation of an actual
right. Once the decision is made, and a breach of a right alleged by a
party, then the latest discussion of the Charter framework seems
relatively clear that on judicial review, courts will examine whether a right
is at stake, and not simply a value.150 On this point, however, Chippewas
147

Supra, note 28, at para. 53.
Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 39, [1999]
2 S.C.R. 817, at para. 56 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Baker”].
149
With thanks to the anonymous reviewer for the suggestion, it would be productive to also
consider similarities and differences with respect to the remedies available for administrative
breaches of Charter rights and values and breaches of the duty to consult. While fuller discussion is
beyond the coverage in this paper, it can be noted that Clyde River confirmed that the quashing of a
decision is the appropriate remedy for inadequate consultation, aligning with familiar approaches
from administrative law. See Bankes, supra, note 6, for comment.
150
For example, LSBC v. TWU, supra, note 91; Ktunaxa Nation, supra, note 60, and
Promislow 2018, supra, note 66. The complaint has been that when a party advances Charter
argument, it is unpredictable when a court will pursue a Charter analysis of an administrative law
analysis, as the Supreme Court did in Baker, supra, note 148. See discussion in Fox-Decent & Pless,
supra, note 8, and Liston, supra, note 9. It remains to be seen whether recent clarifications in LSBC
v. TWU will effectively address this uncertainty and inconsistency.
148
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of the Thames demonstrates that the relatively undeveloped section 35
framework falls flat, illustrating the dangers and concerns of the “values”
critics that constitutional rights might lose their rights-quality; that is, as
a constitutional restraint on government action that calls for rigorous
justification when violated.
What remains underdeveloped in both the Charter and section 35
contexts is the sticking point of adjudicating and reviewing decisions that
impact the more inchoate Charter values or rights claims that are not yet
and may never be recognized as a right. Haida Nation offers the view of
proportionality in those circumstances, and suggests that the eventual
recognition of a right and its violation is not necessary to consider the
constitutional interests at stake. If rights claims are capable of
preliminary assessments, so is the weight and strength of a Charter value
in a given circumstance. As discussed above, the biggest problem with
proportionality under the Haida Nation analysis is that on judicial
review, courts have failed to insist on a specific review of the scoping
exercise that embeds proportionality in the articulation of the depth of
the obligation to consult and accommodate in a given case. Further, the
third step of assessing the adequacy of the consultation process through
the reasonableness standard might itself be enriched and strengthened by
incorporating a values approach that considers the statutory objectives
advanced by the government or tribunal decision in a final balancing
with its impacts on the reconciliation objectives of section 35 and the
survival and flourishing of Indigenous Peoples, cultures and lands that
motivate the individual rights within the section 35 context.151
Finally, the section 35 context would benefit from attention to the
concerns for accessibility of rights protections that motivate judicial review
of the administration of Charter rights. Part of this accessibility is the
avoidance of bifurcation of proceedings, directions that are supported by
allowing rights disputes to be adjudicated through judicial review
proceedings even where the rights dispute was not fully articulated or treated
at the first level of decision. Where recent developments in the Charter
context suggest that adjudication of the scope and breach of a Charter right
is available on judicial review (as noted above), the section 35 context has

151
See, e.g., Brian Slattery, “The Generative Structure of Aboriginal Rights” (2007) 38
S.C.L.R. 595. See also Kainaiwa/Blood Tribe v. Alberta (Minister of Energy), [2017] A.J. No. 149,
2017 ABQB 107 (Alta. Q.B.), regarding reconciliation and honour of the Crown in the reasonableness
analysis.
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moved towards greater bifurcation of proceedings.152 As the Supreme Court
majority stated in Ktunaxa Nation, it is “not for courts to make far-reaching
constitutional declarations in the course of judicial review proceedings
incidental to, and ill-equipped to determine, Aboriginal rights and title
claims”.153
Section 35 rights are thus peripheral to judicial review of
administrative action, and unlike the Charter (and the Supreme Court’s
statement in Paul), the fact that the machinery of government makes
daily decisions that affect and potentially affect Aboriginal rights has no
bearing on ability of Indigenous Peoples to pursue the enforcement of
their rights before tribunals (as well as courts). Instead, these comments
suggest that courts (and tribunals) are fixated on the difficulties and time
involved in historical evidence and proofs required by the Aboriginal and
treaty rights tests. These “practical” concerns under Martin and Paul play
a role in deciding the constitutional jurisdictions on judicial review (and
therefore the record available to the courts on judicial review), but these
concerns are expected to be weighed against overriding concerns for
accessibility.154 Moreover, such concerns may be overstated in relation to
what may be required of a court to make rights adjudication accessible
on judicial review. Not every rights dispute demands adjudication of the
proof of a right; judicial review of the scope and nature of a right claimed
to be breached may be sufficient to provide direction to administrative
decision-makers and to observe on judicial review that a decision is
reasonable or unreasonable in its attention to the nature of the rights at
stake and therefore what is or is not a proportional impact on those
rights. Even if the evidentiary burdens and concerns in the section 35
context are qualitatively different from the Charter context, these features
make the adjudication of section 35 rights even less accessible than
Charter rights, particularly in the continued absence of government and
legislative action to create specialized forms for the adjudication and
152
See, e.g., the evolution of the Prophet River litigation (supra, note 58), in which the
Treaty 8 communities of Prophet River and West Moberly have now launched civil proceedings
seeking a declaration of an unjustified infringement of their Treaty rights and seeking an injunction
to stop construction on the Site C damn in the meantime; pleadings available online: Sage Legal,
<https://www.sagelegal.ca/new-page/>.
153
Supra, note 60, at para. 86. For commentary, see Promislow 2018, supra, note 66.
154
Another potential objection to adjudication of rights disputes not treated by the
administrative decision-maker is the limitation of judicial review to review of the record that was
before the decision-maker at first instance. Here, there are limited exceptions to allow for new
evidence to be entered on judicial review in both constitutional contexts. For discussion, see Ktunaxa
Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operation), [2014]
B.C.J. No. 584, 2014 BCSC 568, at paras. 113-134 (B.C.S.C.).
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recognition of Aboriginal rights.155 The answer is not for courts to wait
for governments to act; attention to the rights claims and disputes at stake
in the section 35 context is required to push governments towards action.
These considerations bolster the arguments for leaning on approaches
taken in relation to the administration of Charter rights in the section 35
context. There are many points upon which courts can appropriately
intervene on judicial review without overstepping their institutional
competence, provided that section 35 protections are understood as fullfledged constitutional rights. If such actions are sufficiently inconvenient
for governments, governments might then, finally, be prompted to act to
create the forums required to address ongoing disputes about the nature,
scope and existence of Aboriginal and treaty rights, and act in concert
with Indigenous Peoples who, at least under the United Nations
Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples, have a right to be consulted
about legislation that will impact them and their rights.156 In short, there
is much to be gained by maintaining the conversation between section 35
and Charter law when it comes to the implementation and administration
of rights. While sui generis approaches have their place in the section 35
canon,157 new concepts like “Crown reliance” and avoiding rights
frameworks through elliptical and partial borrowings from Charter
contexts are not part of the sui generis canon. Instead, further
development of the judicial review principles that apply in review of
government decisions affecting section 35 rights and rights claims, and
further attention to the merger of proportionality and reasonableness are
called for to serve both reconciliation purposes and strengthen
Indigenous parties’ access to the rule of law.
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Government of Canada, “Government of Canada to create Recognition and
Implementation of Rights Framework”, Justin Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada Website
(February 14, 2018): <https://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2018/02/14/government-canada-create-recognitionand-implementation-rights-framework>. The Trudeau government’s proposal has met with
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before introducing legislation: Jorge Barrera, “Promised Indigenous rights recognition legislation
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61/295, 107th Plenary Meeting, September 13, 2007, Article 19. The Mikisew Cree’s
recent attempt to define a similar obligation under s. 35 failed: Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada
(Governor General in Council), [2018] S.C.J. No. 40, 2018 SCC 40 (S.C.C.). It might also be noted
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